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When Individual Differences Demand Equal Treatment:  An Equal Rights Approach to the 
Special Needs of Girls in the Juvenile Justice System 
 
By Marsha L. Levick and Francine T. Sherman1 
 
In 1998, jurisdiction “X,” like many jurisdictions at that time, developed a 
juvenile drug court as an alternative to formal court processing for juveniles charged 
with nonviolent, property or drug related offenses.  Until the summer of 2002 the 
program was only available to boys, though the drug court manual refers to eligible 
juveniles in gender neutral terms such as “youth,” “client,” and “candidate.”  Drug 
court was an alternative to detention for boys who were required to complete an intensive 
program of job training, GED preparation, and counseling with parents.  Participants 
could avoid detention unless they violated probation or failed in the program.  No similar 
program alternatives to detention were available for girls.  The Baltimore City Juvenile 
Court offered no justification for excluding girls for four years, when they opened the 
court to girls in the summer of 2002.  As of December 2002 there were four girls in the 
drug court program and 110 boys. 
 
To accommodate the increase in girls in their justice system, jurisdiction “Y” 
added a 20 bed girls’ unit to their secure boys’ delinquency program.  They did this by 
taking over space which had been set aside for administrative purposes.  Staffing patterns 
were established in the existing male unit, as was scheduling of sick calls, outdoor 
exercise, programming and use of the gymnasium. Because the program was only adding 
20 youth, the program administrators determined no additional staff were needed and 
continued the existing programming and schedules.  This decision has plainly 
disadvantaged the girls in the program.  They do not get a daily sick call, which is 
needed due to the increased medical complaints of girls and the way in which those 
complaints affect their attitudes and functioning.  The failure to add staff does not allow 
girls the level of staff attention they require and also results in girls being confined to 
their unit throughout the weekend because they need to be supervised apart from the 
boys. Girls also receive less gross motor recreation than the boys, who are seen as 
“needing more exercise.” When the girls are in the yard, they are with boys who 
monopolize the basketball court.  Finally, the school program is designed around the 
boys’ educational level, which is below 9th grade. This makes them ineligible for GED or 
college preparation.  The girls, many of whom are runaways, have higher academic 
achievement, but they are held back by the boy’s academic limitations.  Finally, with no 
new staff or programming, staff are untrained in gender responsive approaches so that 
girls’ mental health, trauma and family issues are not addressed. 
 
1 Marsha L. Levick is the Legal Director of the Juvenile Law Center, and a Lecturer at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School.  Francine T. Sherman is a Clinical Professor at Boston College Law School and Director 
of the Juvenile Rights Advocacy Project, where she represents and does policy advocacy for girls in the juvenile 
justice system.  The authors would like to thank Jennifer Pokempner, Suzanne Meiners, Rebecca Talmud, 
AmieBenedetto, Julianna Jamal and Amanda Hector for their assistance in the preparation of this article.  
  
 
 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
 As girls have entered the juvenile justice system in ever increasing numbers,2 the 
limitations of a system built on the profiles and characteristics of young male offenders have 
become manifest.  The influx of girls has not only stretched the resources of this system, it 
challenges all who work in the juvenile justice system to pay heed to their special needs - needs 
that may or may not be addressed by programs focused on, and driven by, boys’ experience and 
backgrounds.  Girls deserve programs and services that allow them to flourish as individuals, 
freed from generalizations about what girls can or cannot, or should or should not, do.    
 The programmatic scenarios described above illustrate two of the ways in which girls are 
denied equality in the juvenile justice system.  The story of the drug court in jurisdiction “X” 
exemplifies the problem of equal access, where girls are denied access to certain procedural or 
programmatic alternatives available to boys, and shows how such a denial can result in 
significant disadvantages for the girls affected.  Typically, jurisdictions argue that ‘boy-only’ 
programs are pilots designed to gather data for later expansion to girls or that it is cost 
prohibitive to expand or develop alternatives for girls when they still comprise just a fraction of 
youth in the system.  The second illustrates the lack of attention to the specific needs of girls in 
juvenile justice programming.  Too often girls’ units are simply added to programs designed for 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., MELISSA SICKMUND, Presentation at the American Society of Criminology Conference, Atlanta 
Georgia, (November 7, 2001) in A PROFILE OF FEMALES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2002) 
(Stating that during the 1990s the volume of cases involving detention increased substantially more for girls than for 
boys.  In 1999 juvenile courts detained 4% more boys than in 1990 compared with 50% more girls); HOWARD 
  3 
                                                                                                                                                            
boys with no thought given to what adjustments in programming or staffing may be required to 
meet the needs of this new population.3   
 As these examples show, the dilemma of gender in juvenile justice has two parts.  On the 
one hand, research suggests that many young female offenders share a 
social/emotional/psychological profile different from their male peers – more laden with 
histories of childhood physical and sexual abuse, greater incidence of depression and related 
mental health disorders, and relationship-centered outbreaks of violence.  These findings suggest 
that resources must be created and marshaled to meet these particular aspects of girls’ 
experience.  On the other hand, girls have also suffered from timeworn stereotypes about their 
place in society.  Even when “girl-only” resources are made available, they tend to offer more 
limited vocational and programming opportunities, and reflect “fixed notions concerning the 
roles and abilities of males and females.” 4  Thus, girls’ vocational choices may be limited to 
fields like health, cosmetology and hair care, their recreational choices may exclude 
opportunities to play basketball, weight-lift, or engage in other ‘large-muscle’ forms of exercise 
typically made available to boys.5  
 This article argues that the disparities girls face in the juvenile justice system can be 
remedied by employing an equal rights analysis, including the federal Equal Protection Clause, 
state Equal Rights Amendments and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.6  We note 
that in the adult prison context, the Equal Protection Clause has afforded adult women offenders 
 
SNYDER, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUVENILE CRIME 11 (2002) (Stating that from 1983 through 1997 the 
juvenile arrests rate for girls increased 72% while increasing 30% for boys).   
3 See, Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice, PAINTING IT PINK IS NOT ENOUGH (demonstrating aptly in 
title). 
4 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 712, 725 (1982) 
5 Girls in detention and residential programs complain of lack of access to basketball and other sports, as well as 
lack of training in trades like construction.  Interviews with girls on file with Professor Sherman. 
only mixed success in their challenges to discriminatory conditions and practices in the criminal 
justice system.  This is based on the view of some courts that differences between adult male and 
female offenders bar a finding that they are similarly situated for the purposes of equal protection 
analysis.  For girls, the juvenile justice system’s historic commitment to individualized treatment 
and rehabilitation flips this concern on its head.  A legal strategy that aims to ensure equally 
effective individualized treatment and rehabilitation opportunities for boys and girls does nothing 
more than ask the juvenile court to ‘put its money where its mouth is.’  Where differences 
between male and female adult offenders have undermined equal rights challenges in the adult 
arena, in the juvenile justice system, differences among individual youth are acknowledged, and 
dispositions are driven by these individual needs.  Indeed, these historic – and prevailing -- 
purposes of the juvenile court are critical to each of the strategies we suggest.  Just as the right to 
individualized treatment should lead to more favorable outcomes for girls under the Equal 
Protection Clause, this emphasis on the individual is also the foundation of challenges under 
state ERAs and Title IX.  As we discuss each these options below, we suggest ways in which 
these constitutional and statutory provisions can be most effectively used on behalf of girls.  
 We begin with a look at who these girls are and the pathways they take into the justice 
system.  We then review the longstanding purpose and philosophy of the juvenile justice system 
to promote individualized treatment and rehabilitation and show how this philosophy actually 
serves an equal rights approach to meeting the needs of individual girls.  The article concludes 
with a discussion of the federal Equal Protection Clause, as well as state Equal Rights 
Amendments and Title IX, and explores how these legal strategies can be used to ensure equal 
access and advance gender-responsive programming for girls.   
Girls in the Juvenile Justice System: Who Are They? 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) 
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Promoting the rights of girls in the juvenile justice system requires an understanding of 
who these girls are.  While boys and girls entering the system share many characteristics, 
research confirms that girls overwhelmingly suffer from childhood histories of trauma and abuse, 
mental health disorders, and family separation.  In addition, girls are more likely to be involved 
in prostitution or prostitution-related offenses.  Finally, girls in the system, like boys, have 
experienced significant school failure.  
Mental and Physical Health  
Studies consistently show that adolescent girls in the justice system have higher rates of 
depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and other diagnosable mental health 
disorders than boys, resulting in significant distress and contributing to behavioral problems in 
custody.7  For example, a study of girls committed to the California Youth Authority revealed 
that 65% exhibited symptoms of PTSD at some point in their lives, and 49% were exhibiting 
those symptoms at the time of the study.8  In a study of girls in the Georgia Youth Detention 
Centers, 60% met criteria for anxiety disorders, and 59% for mood disorder.9  Similarly, 
delinquent girls studied by the Oregon Social Learning Center had more significant mental 
health problems than boys  over 75% of the girls in study met the criteria for three or more 
DSM IV Axis 1 diagnoses.10  And in a Pennsylvania study looking at data collected through the 
                                                 
7 See, Cauffman, E., Feldman, S., Steiner, H., and Waterman, J, Posttraumatic stress disorder among female 
juvenile offenders, 37 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1209-17 (1998). 
8 See, Cauffman, E., Feldman, S., Steiner, H., and Waterman, J, Posttraumatic stress disorder among female 
juvenile offenders, 37 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1209-17 (1998). 
9 See, National Mental Health Association, Factsheet: Mental Health and Adolescent Girls in the Justice System 
(1999) at http://www.nmha.org./children.justjuv/girlsjj.cfm. 
10 PATRICIA CHAMBERLAIN & KEVIN MOORE, CHAOS AND TRAUMA IN THE LIVES OF 
ADOLESCENT FEMALES WITH ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND DELINQUENCY in RICKY GREENWALD 
et al. TRAUMA AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: THEORY, RESEARCH AND INTERVENTIONS 79 
(Haworth Press., 2002). 
Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument (MAYSI),11  preliminary results indicate that 32% of 
the girls had contemplated suicide and 72% said they were depressed -- approximately double 
the findings for boys.12   
In addition to higher rates of emotional disorders, girls also engage in sexually risky 
behaviors and tend to have higher rates of STDs than girls in the community.13  Many girls in the 
justice system are currently involved in prostitution where they are subject to sexual violence 
from pimps and johns.  11.4% of girls detained in San Francisco in March of 2002 had a 
prostitution charge.14  In many jurisdictions, where substantial numbers of girls are arrested for 
prostitution-related offenses such as running away, drugs, or public order offenses, experts 
believe these arrest patterns mask high rates of underlying prostitution among detained girls.  In 
Atlanta, for example, the juvenile court judges, prosecutors, and youth advocates all agree that 
prostitution is much more prevalent among detained girls than is apparent from their offenses.15  
Girls detained in San Francisco and Atlanta talk of being robbed, beaten and kidnapped by pimps 
and johns, a level of significant and ongoing abuse which requires specialized attention and 
treatment.16  
History of Childhood Trauma 
A history of physical or sexual victimization is one of the most common characteristics of 
                                                 
11 See Grisso, T. and Barnham, R., Manual for Use with Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument.  The MAYSI is 
a mental health screen developed in Massachusetts in the late 1990’s for use with delinquent youth.  It is currently 
being given to all youth entering detention in Pennsylvania.  [more]? 
12 Steve Twedt, Confined Teens' Troubles Run Deep: State finds over 50% suffer mental illness PITTSBURGH 
POST GAZETTE, October 6, 2002. 
13 Morris RE, Harrison EA, Knox GW, Tromanhauser E, Marquis DK, Watts LL, Health Risk Behavioral Survey 
from 39 Juvenile Correctional Facilities in the US, 17 J. ADOLESC. HEALTH 334-344 (1995). 
14 San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department, City and County of San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department, 
Girls Services Unit Statistics (March, 2002) (reporting statistics based on a sample size of 105 girls detained at San 
Francisco’s Youth Guidance Center). 
15 See Roslyn M. Satchel, Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States and the State of 
Georgia:Concerning Georgia Juvenile Justice Facilities for  Southern Center for Human Rights, Atlanta, Georgia 
(2002).  
. 
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girls in the justice system, with significantly greater numbers of girls than boys reporting such 
incidents.  Additionally, the severity of this victimization is staggering.  For example, chronically 
delinquent girls studied by the Oregon Social Learning Center reported their first sexual 
encounters at an average age of 6.75.17   An overwhelming 92% of girls interviewed in four 
California counties in 1998 had suffered some form of abuse ─ 88% suffered emotional abuse, 
81% reported physical abuse, and 56% report one or more form of sexual abuse; 40% reported at 
least once incident of forced sex and 17% reported more than five incidents of forced sex.18 
Research from the Oregon Social Learning Center shows that while 3.0% of boys in their study 
had documented histories of physical abuse and family violence, 77.8% of the girls had histories 
of abuse and family violence.19  A longitudinal study involving 1575 cases found that girls and 
women with histories of childhood abuse or neglect were 73% more likely than females without 
abuse histories to be arrested for property, alcohol, drug and misdemeanor offenses such as 
disorderly conduct, curfew violations or loitering.  Moreover, unlike boys, girls with childhood 
experiences of abuse and neglect were more likely to be arrested as a juvenile or adult for a 
violent offense than those who did not have abuse histories.20 
Finally, girls in detention and incarceration also report physical and sexual abuse by male 
staff.21  The power imbalance inherent in any custodial relationship, combined with the age 
difference between girls in custody and male staff, are coercive elements to which girls with 
 
16 Id.  See also, Sherman  interviews 
17 Patti Chamberlain, Presentation at the 2nd National Training Conference on Juvenile Detention Reform, The 
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care Model Research and Community-Based Services 5 (January 24-26, 2002). 
18 Leslie Acoca & Kelly Dedel No Place to Hide: Understanding and Meeting the Needs of Girls in the California 
Juvenile Justice System, for National Council on Crime and Delinquency, San Francisco, CA 60, 62 (1998). 
19 Patti Chamberlain, supra n. 16 at 5. 
20  See, Cathy S. Widom &  Michael G. Maxfield, An Update on the “Cycle of Violence”, in Brief, National Institute 
of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs 1,3,5 (February, 2001). 
21 See Leslie Acoca & Kelly Dedel supra note 17, at 77 
histories of victimization are particularly vulnerable.22  Likewise, while restraints and isolation 
are common mechanisms for controlling behavior in detention and other residential facilities, the 
use of such disciplinary measures can cause girls to relive the trauma of sexual abuse in these 
situations.  The use of restraints is particularly problematic for pregnant girls.  Additionally, 
isolation, which is known to increase the risk of suicide in adolescents generally,23 poses 
particular dangers for girls who routinely report higher rates of suicide attempts.   
Family Separation and Stress  
Housing instability, family separation, and disrupted relationships also characterize the lives 
of girls in the justice system and are believed to contribute to their delinquency. Delinquent girls 
studied by the Oregon Social Learning Center had an average of 16 home transitions — more 
than 1 home transition for each year of their lives. Seventy three percent of the girls in the study 
came from a single-parent household as compared with 56% of boys; 35% of girls came from 
low income households as compared with 22% of boys.24  67% of the girls had fathers convicted 
of a crime and 48% had mothers convicted of a crime.25  In Duval County, Florida, more than 
half of the girls interviewed in the juvenile system had parents who abused drugs and nearly a 
third had a parent who was currently incarcerated.  One in five girls had a deceased parent. 26   
This pattern of family separation is often repeated by the justice system itself, where many 
girls experience forced separation from their own children.  Of girls studied in the California 
Youth Authority in 1998, 29% had been pregnant at least once, and 16% had been pregnant 
                                                 
22 See, Amnesty International, Abuse of Women in Custody: Sexual Misconduct and Shackling of Pregnant Women, 
A State-by-State Survey of Policies and practices in the USA 9 (2001) available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/custody/abuseincustody.html. (Finding that for example, forty-seven states have 
statutes aimed at protecting individuals in custody by imposing criminal penalties for sexual misconduct in custody, 
either explicitly or implicitly including minors in detention and other forms of custody). 
23 See, e.g., SK Goldsmith, TC Pellmar, AM Kleinman, WE Bunney, Reducing Suicide: A National Imperative, The National 
Academies Press, 2002, at pp. 331-374, (Identifying social isolation as a barrier to effective suicide reduction.)  
24 Patti Chamberlain, supra note 16 at 5.  
25 Id.  
  9 
while in custody. 27  According to a survey of probation caseloads in Cook County, Illinois in 
September 2002, just over 20 % of all girls on probation were pregnant or parenting.28  Recent 
changes in federal law unfortunately enhance the risk of permanent separation for these girls and 
their children. Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act29 (ASFA), which imposes strict time 
frames for removal, placement and permanency for children separated from their parents, the 
chances of reunification are reduced once the child has been removed and placed in foster care.30 
School Failure 
Even more than for boys, negative attitudes towards school and school failure are powerful 
predictors of delinquency in girls.31  In the study of girls in the juvenile justice system in Duval 
County, Florida, school failure  either in the form of truancy, suspension, poor grades, or 
expulsion  was found to be the most statistically significant risk factor for girls who were 
repeat offenders.32  39% of girls whose case files were reviewed and 90% of girls interviewed 
had histories of school suspension.  Twenty-five percent of girls interviewed needed special 
education services and 36% of the case files reviewed reflected special education needs.33  
Lastly, studies indicate that girls are particularly vulnerable to school failure during pre- and 
early adolescence.34 
                                                                                                                                                             
26 Leslie Acoca, Educate or Incarcerate: Girls in the Florida and Duval County Juvenile Justice Systems for National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency (2000). 
27 Leslie Acoca & Kelly Dedel, supra note 17, at 88. 
28 Ken  Keller, Presentation to the American Society of Criminology Conference, Juvenile Female Offenders in Cook County: 
Trends and Outcomes. (November 14, 2002).  
29 Public Law 105-89, 42 U.S.C.A. § 670, et. seq.. 
30 Gail Smith, Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 and Its Impact on Prisoner Mothers and their Children", Women, Girls 
and Criminal Justice, Vol. 1, No. 1, December/January 2000. 
31 Phillip Harris, The Female Delinquent. ProDES: The Program Development and Evaluation System.  Philadelphia, PA: Crime 
and Justice Research Institute and the Division of Juvenile Justice Services, for Department of Human Services.   
32 Leslie Acoca, supra note 24 ,at   . 
33 Id. 
34 Id.. 
  This portrait of girls in the juvenile justice system shows a pattern of pre-delinquent  
trauma that runs deeper than that experienced by many of their male counterparts.  Moreover, 
while there has been a marked increase in the arrest rates of girls for more violent crimes such as 
aggravated assault,35 girls are still significantly more likely than boys to be arrested for status 
offenses such as running away, curfew violations, and underage drinking, as well as prostitution 
and related offenses.36   As discussed below, differences in the personal and criminal histories of 
adult male and female offenders have caused some judges to reject challenges to gender-based 
disparities in the criminal justice system under the Equal Protection Clause.  In the juvenile 
justice system, however, where dispositions must still be tailored in most states to meet 
individual needs, these individual differences between and among juvenile offenders are – or 
should be -- an essential component of dispositional planning if the mandate of the system is to 
be fulfilled. 
The Right to Individualized Treatment: The Enduring Purpose and Philosophy of the 
Juvenile Justice System 
 
 
                                                
"The hallmark of the [juvenile justice] system was its disposition, individually tailored to 
address the needs and abilities of the juvenile in question."37 Treatment rather than punishment 
has been central to the philosophy of the juvenile court.38  The United States Supreme Court has 
itself repeatedly recognized this essential feature of the court.  In its landmark decision In re 
 
35 Melissa  Sickmund & Wan, Y. Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Data Book (2001), at 
http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/cjrp.  (stating, from 1980 through 2000 arrests of girls for simple assault 
increased 257% and in 2000 the arrests rate of girls for aggravated assault was 88% above its 1987 level).    
36 MELISSA SICKMUND, Presentation at the American Society of Criminology Conference, Atlanta Georgia, 
(November 7, 2001) in A PROFILE OF FEMALES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2002) (stating for 
example, the female proportion of juvenile arrests was 28%, yet girls accounted for 59% of juvenile arrests for 
running away, 55% of juvenile arrests for prostitution, 37% of juvenile arrests for larceny/theft,  31% of juvenile 
arrests for curfew, 29% of juvenile arrests for alcohol related offenses, and 28 juvenile arrests for disorderly 
conduct).   
37 Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the 
Juvenile Court, 69 N.C.L.Rev. 1083, 1099 (1991). 
38 See Juvenile Delinquency, Peter C. Kratcoski & Lucille D. Kratcoski (4th Ed., Prentice Hall 1996) 77 
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Gault,39 the Court expressly noted the historical purpose of the court to treat and rehabilitate, 
rather than punish.40  Justice White, in his oft-quoted concurrence in McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania,41 decided a few years after Gault, captured the fundamental differences between 
the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems: 
Reprehensible acts by juveniles are not deemed the consequence of mature and 
malevolent choice but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces 
beyond their control. Hence the state legislative judgment not to stigmatize the juvenile 
delinquent by branding him a criminal; his conduct is not deemed so blameworthy that 
punishment is required to deter him or others. Coercive measures, where employed, are 
considered neither retribution nor punishment. Supervision or confinement is aimed at 
rehabilitation, not at convincing the juvenile of his error simply by imposing pains and 
penalties. Nor is the purpose to make the juvenile delinquent an object lesson for others, 
whatever his own merits or demerits may be. A typical disposition in the juvenile court 
where delinquency is established may authorize confinement until age 21, but it will last 
no longer and within that period will last only so long as his behavior demonstrates that 
he remains an unacceptable risk if returned to his family. Nor is the authorization for 
custody until 21 any measure of the seriousness of the particular act that the juvenile has 
performed. 42 
 
This philosophy of the juvenile court emanates from the belief that youth are less 
blameworthy and more capable of reform than adults.  As well, it is believed that parents, 
society, and the state have a caretaking and custodial role to play with respect to minors that they 
do not have with adults.  Unlike criminal courts, juvenile courts exercise jurisdiction as parens 
patriae.43  A “medical model” has therefore predominated in which behavioral ills have been 
identified and diagnosed, with treatment and therapy the focus of disposition.44  Even where 
 
39 387 U. S. 1 (1967)  
40 Id. at 15 (Noting that the early reformers committed to the juvenile court model believed in the inherent good of 
children and worked to design a system to provide for the child’s “care and solitude,” preventing any “downward 
slide” in behavior). 
41 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (Rejecting the propositions that juveniles have a constitutional right to trial by jury in a plurality opinion) 
42 Id. at 551-552 (White concurring). 
43 Paul Holland & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Whatever Happened to the Right to Treatment? : The Modern Quest for A 
Historical Promise, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1791, 1813 (1995). 
44 Id.  Most states treat youth who come under their custody, either as dependent or delinquent, in a different manner 
than adults in its custody.  Whether as delinquent or dependent, youth in a custodial or supervisory relationship with 
“punishment” has been included by some jurisdictions recently as a component of disposition, 
the juvenile court retains its obligation “to insure that manifest rehabilitation accompanies the 
inevitable punishment.”45  
  Accordingly, forty-eight states include rehabilitation, in some form, within the purpose 
clause of their juvenile justice statutes.46  Twenty-five states speak specifically of rehabilitation47 
as a goal.  Some states are explicit in directing how rehabilitation should be achieved or what it 
should involve, such as Florida, Idaho, Hawaii, Illinois, South Carolina, and Texas.48  Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the state are treated as wards to whom the state must care for and provide guidance for in addition to placing 
requirements or constraints on the youth.  The state as parens patriae has this responsibility to the youth and society.   
45 Holland and Mlyniec, at 1813. 
46 See e.g., Idaho Code Title 20. State Prison and County Jails Chapter 5. Juvenile Corrections Act. Current through 
the 2000 Cumulative Supplement (2nd Regular Session of the 55th Legislature). 20-504-A. State juvenile 
corrections centers -- Purposes -- Powers and duties of the department and the director; Maine Revised Statutes 
Annotated Title 34-A. Corrections Chapter 3. Correctional Facilities Subchapter V. Southern Maine Juvenile 
Facility. Current through 1999 2nd regular session of 119th Legislature. § 3802. Purposes; North Dakota Century 
Code Title 27. Judicial Branch of Government Chapter 27-20. Uniform Juvenile Court Act. Current through 2001 
regular session. 27-20-01 Interpretation;  
47 National Center for Juvenile Justice. 2002. State Juvenile Justice Profiles. Pittsburgh, PA: NCJJ. Online. 
Available: http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/. (referred to as NCJJ further in notes); see also e.g., Tennessee Code 
Annotated Title 37 Juveniles Chapter 5 Department of Children's Services Part 1-- General Provisions. Current 
through end of 2000 regular session. 37-5-102. Purpose, (Consistent with the protection of the public interest, 
remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior 
and substitute therefor a program of treatment, training and rehabilitation); Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes and 
Consolidated Statutes Annotated Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated Title 62. Poor Persons and Public 
Welfare Chapter 1. Public Welfare Code Article III. State Institutions in the Department of Public Welfare (D) 
Youth Development Centers for Delinquent Juveniles. Current through Act 2001-77 § 341. Purpose, (…To provide 
for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision, care and rehabilitation which provide balanced 
attention to the protection of the community…); Hawaii Revised Statutes Annotated Division 1. Property; 
Government Title 20. Social Services Chapter 352D. Current through the 2000 Special Session (§ 352D-4). 
Establishment; purpose, (…to prevent delinquency, and to reduce the incidence of recidivism among juveniles 
through the provision of prevention, rehabilitation, and treatment services); West's Smith-Hurd Illinois Compiled 
Statutes Annotated Chapter 705. Courts Juvenile Courts Act 405. Juvenile Court Act of 1987 Article V. Delinquent 
Minors Part 1. General Provisions. Current through P.A. 92-11, apv. 6/11/2001. 405/5-101. Purpose and policy, (To 
provide an individualized assessment of each alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile, in order to rehabilitate 
and to prevent further delinquent behavior through the development of competency in the juvenile offender) 
48 NCJJ; see also e.g., West's Florida Statutes Annotated Title XLVII. Criminal Procedure and Corrections Chapter 
985. Delinquency; Interstate Compact on Juveniles Part I. General Provisions. Current through end of 2000 second 
regular session. 985.01. Purposes and intent; personnel standards and screening.  (To provide children …with 
training in life skills, including career education); Idaho Code Title 20. State Prison and County Jails Chapter 5. 
Juvenile Corrections Act. Current through the 2000 Cumulative Supplement (2nd Regular Session of the 55th 
Legislature). 20-504-A. State juvenile corrections centers -- Purposes -- Powers and duties of the department and the 
director, (counseling juveniles regarding employment, education, courts, family, and life skills; 
treatment…programs would strengthen juvenile’s relationship with family, engender commitment to school and 
employment, promote the development of competency and life skills and help juveniles generalize appropriate 
behavior into their environment; education and treatment…confronting eliminating delinquent norms, criminal 
  13 
                                                                                                                                                            
while the precise language of rehabilitation varies,49 even states that do not mention 
rehabilitation explicitly do so implicitly by providing that youth develop the skills necessary to 
return to society as productive individuals.  For example, “the protection and the wholesome 
moral, mental and physical development of children” as well as “personal and social growth” are 
recurring themes which appear in seventeen state purpose clauses.50  Eighteen purpose clauses 
speak of developing juveniles into productive citizens.51  Many states provide that juveniles be 
given “care, guidance, and control.”52 “Treatment” appears in twenty of the purpose clauses.53  In 
 
thinking and antisocial behavior and making restitution programs); Idaho Code Title 20. State Prison and County 
Jails Chapter 5. Juvenile Corrections Act. Current through the 2000 Cumulative Supplement (2nd Regular Session 
of the 55th Legislature). 20-504-A. State juvenile corrections centers -- Purposes -- Powers and duties of the 
department and the director, (to provide for the care, the protection, and the wholesome moral, mental, and physical 
development of children; aimed at rehabilitation and reestablishment in society) 
49 See e.g., Alaska Statutes. Title 47. Welfare, Social Services and Institutions. Chapter 12. Delinquent Minors. 
Article 1. Juvenile Delinquency. Sec. 47.12.010. Goal and purposes of chapter. Current through Third Special 
Session of the Twenty-First Legislature (2000).; Revised Statutes Annotated of the State of Utah Code, 1953 Title 
78. Judicial Code Part I. Courts Chapter 3a. Juvenile Courts Part 1. General Provisions. Current through the 2001 
Supplement (2001 First Special Session). 78-3a-102. Establishment of juvenile court --Organization and status of 
court –Purpose; New Hampshire Title XII. Public Safety and Welfare Chapter 169-B. Delinquent Children. Current 
through Chapter 328 of the 2000 regular session. 169-B:1. Applicability of Chapter, Purpose; 
50 NCJJ; See also e.g., Wyoming Statutes 1977 Title 14. Children Chapter 6. Juveniles Article 2. Juvenile Justice 
Act. Current through end of 2001 regular session. § 14-6-201. Definitions; short title; statement of purpose and 
interpretation.  New Jersey Statutes Annotated Title 2a. Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice Subtitle 1. The 
Courts Chapter 4a. Family Court Article 2. Code of Juvenile Justice. Current through L.2001, c. 100. 2A:4A-21. 
Purposes, (Care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of juveniles…); Minnesota Statutes 
Annotated Public Welfare and Related Activities Chapter 260B. Delinquency General Provisions. Current through 
end of 2000 regular session. 260B.001. Title, intent, and construction, (This purpose should be pursued through 
means that are fair and just, that recognize the unique characteristics and needs of children, and that give children 
access to opportunities for personal and social growth.) 
51 NCJJ; See also, e.g., West's Wisconsin Statutes Annotated Crimes Chapter 938. Juvenile Justice Code Subchapter 
I. General Provisions. Current through 2001 Act 15, published 8/31/01. 938.01. Title, legislative intent and purposes, 
(The development of competency in the juvenile offender, so that he or she is more capable of living productively 
and responsibly in the community); West's Annotated Mississippi Code Title 43. Public Welfare Chapter 21. Youth 
Court Organization, Administration and Operation. Current through end of 2000 3rd executive session. § 43-21-103. 
Construction; statement of policy. (Each child coming within the jurisdiction of the youth court shall become a 
responsible, accountable and productive citizen) 
52 See e.g., Iowa Code Annotated Title VI. Human Services Subtitle 5. Juveniles Chapter 232. Juvenile Justice 
Division I. Construction and Definitions. Current through end of 2000 regular session. 232.1. Rules of construction; 
Vernon's Annotated Missouri Statutes Title XII. Public Health and Welfare Chapter 211. Juvenile Courts. Current 
through end of 2000 2nd regular session 90th General Assembly. Purpose of law--how construed; General Laws of 
Rhode Island Annotated, 1956 Title 14. Delinquent and Dependent Children Chapter 1. Proceedings in Family 
Court. Current through end of 2000 regular session. 14-1-2. Purpose of chapter. 
the Kentucky purpose clause, treatment is guaranteed to all juveniles who are brought before the 
juvenile court.54  
Even states that have more recently modeled their purpose clauses after the “balanced 
and restorative justice”55 (“BARJ”) philosophy include rehabilitation language along with 
concepts of restitution.56  The BARJ principles include developing the juvenile’s skills,57 and are 
also based on individualized care.58  In these states, rehabilitation encompasses both restoration 
of the juvenile as a productive member of society, as well as restitution to the victim and their 
                                                                                                                                                             
53 NCJJ; See also, e.g., West's Colorado Revised Statutes. Annotated Title 19. Children's Code Article 2. The 
Colorado Juvenile Justice System. Part 1. General Provisions. § 19-2-102. Legislative declaration. Current through 
end of 2001 1st Regular Session, (Providing appropriate treatment to reduce the rate of recidivism… and to assist 
the juvenile in becoming a productive member of society); Delaware Code Annotated Title 29. State Government 
Part 8. Departments of Government Chapter 90. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families. 
Current through 2000 Regular Session. § 9001. Intent and purpose, (Care, and treatment as will best service the 
interests of the public, the family, and the offender…) Annotated Code of Maryland Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings. Title 3. Courts of General Jurisdiction -- Jurisdiction/Special Causes of Action. Subtitle 8. Juvenile 
Causes. Current through the regular session of the 2000 General Assembly. § 3-802. Purposes and construction of 
subtitle. (To provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development…a program of 
treatment, training and rehabilitation consistent with the child’s best interests…) 
54 NCJJ; Baldwin's Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated Title LI. Unified Juvenile Code Chapter 600. Introductory 
Matters. Current through end of 2001 regular session. 600.010. Title and Internet of KRS Chapters 600 to 645. 
55 See e.g., Guide for Implimenting the Balanced and Restorative Justice Model  at 
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/implementing/foreword.html (explaining the three priorities of BARJ -- public safety, 
accountability, and competency development -- recognize both victim and offender restoration as critical goals of 
community justice); Balanced and Restorative Justice: Program Summary for Officeof Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention  at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/bal.pdf, (explaining, as a concrete mission, the balanced 
approach allows juvenile justice systems and agencies to improve their capacity to protect the community and 
ensure accountability of the offender and the system. It enables offenders to become competent and productive 
citizens. Restorative justice, the guiding philosophical framework for this vision, promotes maximum involvement 
of the victim, the offender, and the community in the justice process and presents a clear alternative to sanctions and 
intervention based on retributive or traditional treatment assumptions.  Within the context of the restorative justice 
philosophy, the balanced approach mission helps juvenile justice systems become more responsive to the needs of 
victims, offenders, and the community). 
56 See, www.mibarj.org/what/barjnot.html (explaining, not in terms of imposing punishment but in terms of tailoring 
an individualized response that does the best job of holding the young person accountable to the victims and the 
community.); see also e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2 (West 1992) (stating, to provide an individualized 
assessment of each alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile); WIS. STAT. ANN. §938.01 (2002) (stating, 
provide an individualized assessment of each alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile). 
57 See, WIS. STAT. ANN. §938.01 (2002) (stating, to equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live 
responsibly and productively) 
58 See, www.mibarj.org/what/barjnot.html (explaining, not in terms of imposing punishment but in terms of tailoring 
an individualized response that does the best job of holding the young person accountable to the victims and the 
community.); see also e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2 (West 1992) (stating, to provide an individualized 
assessment of each alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile); WIS. STAT. ANN. §938.01 (2002) (stating, 
provide an individualized assessment of each alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile). 
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family in the community.59  For example, Oregon’s purpose clause states, “The system is 
founded on the principles of personal responsibility, accountability and reformation within the 
context of public safety and restitution to the victims and to the community.”60 Notably, Illinois 
is the only state which currently uses BARJ philosophy in its purpose clause and also has an 
ERA.61  Illinois’s purpose clause uses both rehabilitative and individualized language.62   
Consistent with the juvenile justice system’s emphasis on individualized treatment, three 
states, Oregon,63 Connecticut,64 and Minnesota65 have passed statutes providing expressly for 
gender responsive programming or equal access to programming for youth of both genders.66  
As a direct consequence of the juvenile justice system’s commitment to individualized 
treatment and rehabilitation, disposition is driven by the needs of the offender rather than the 
offense. Where the criminal justice system metes out punishment in accordance with statutory 
guidelines calibrated to the type and seriousness of the offense committed, a significant number 
of the juvenile justice statutes require that dispositions be based on the individual needs of the 
youth.67  For example, Florida’s purpose clause requires that there be an assessment to determine 
consequences consistent with the seriousness of the act, public safety, and the prior record of the 
 
 
59 See e.g. id. 
60 OR. REV. STAT. §419C.001   
61 See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2 (West 1992). 
62 See id, (stating, to rehabilitate and to prevent further delinquent behavior through the development of competency 
in the juvenile offender), and  (to provide an individualized assessment of each alleged and adjudicated delinquent 
juvenile). 
63 Or. Rev. Stat. § 471.270 (2001)  
64 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-121h (2002) 
65 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 241.70 1992 
66 Both Oregon and Minnesota are also Barj states, so their statutes address gender responsiveness and 
individualized programming.   See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-121h (2002);  Minn. Stat. Ann. § 241.70 1992 
67 See e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2 (West 1992) (stating, to provide an individualized assessment of each 
alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile); , IDAHO CODE §§ 20-504 (Michie 2000) (stating, these services and 
programs will individualize treatment and control of the juvenile offender for the benefit of the juvenile and the 
child and specific rehabilitation needs of the child.68  New Mexico lists several factors which 
should be considered in delinquency proceedings, including “the child’s age, education, mental 
and physical condition, background, and all other relevant factors.”69  Alaska, Connecticut, 
Colorado, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Washington include language requiring that the youth be 
offered some individualized treatment.70  Alaska’s purpose clause calls for “an early, 
individualized assessment and action plan for each juvenile offender… through the development 
of appropriate skills…so that the juvenile is more capable of living productively.”71   
In the face of such overwhelming statutory authority, courts have repeatedly referenced 
the juvenile court’s historic and continuing commitment to individualized treatment and 
rehabilitation, while highlighting the distinctions between the juvenile and adult justice systems.  
For example, In the Interest of J.F.,72 where the court declined to extend to juveniles charged 
with certain felonies in Pennsylvania the right to a jury trial, the court stated that "[w]hile the 
principles and policies underlying our juvenile justice system have evolved, particular 
importance is still placed upon rehabilitating and protecting society's youth." The court continued 
that "the goal of developing juvenile offenders into responsible and productive members of the 
community…remains the cornerstone of our system of juvenile justice."73  While recent 
amendments to Pennsylvania’s Act imposed harsher consequences for some juveniles, the court 
held "the amendments to the Act do not undermine the goal of supervision, care and 
                                                                                                                                                             
protection of society…[and] provide for a diversity of innovative and effective programs through research on 
delinquent behavior and the continuous evaluation of correctional programs). 
68 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001 (West 1998). 
69 See N.M. STAT. ANN. 32A-2-2 (Michie 2000). 
70 NCJJ, see also e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-121h. (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. 32A-2-2 (Michie 
2000); WASH. REV. STAT. § 13.40.010 (West Supp. 2001). 
71 ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.082 (Michie 1996). 
72 In re J.F. 714 A.2d 467, 471 (Pa. Super. 1998) 
73 Id. 
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rehabilitation of juvenile offenders and that the dispositional alternatives available to the court 
remain rehabilitative and are not punitive in nature."74  
In State in the Interest of D.J.,75 where the Supreme Court of Louisiana likewise rejected 
a challenge to the denial of jury trials to juveniles, the Court echoed the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court.  The court stated that "the unique nature of the juvenile system is manifested in its non-
criminal, or 'civil,' nature, its focus on rehabilitation and individual treatment rather than 
retribution, and the state's role as parens patriae in managing the welfare of the juvenile in state 
custody."76 
Further underscoring the central rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system, 
courts have also repeatedly recognized a “right to treatment” for juveniles who have been 
adjudicated delinquent, although the legal underpinnings of this right have evolved over the 
course of the last three decades.  Early cases decided in the 1970’s relied on the 8th and 14th 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution to find a constitutional right to treatment for adjudicated 
youth.77  In particular, these cases generally found the right to treatment in the due process 
 
74 Id. at 473. 
75 State ex. rel. D.J., 817 So.2d 26 (La. 2002). 
76 Id., quoting  In re C.B., 97-2783, 708 So.2d 391, 396-97 (La. 1998) ("rehabilitative treatment rather than mere 
punitive incarceration"). 
77 See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (challenging conditions of confinement of delinquents on 
Eighth Amendment grounds); Pena v. Division of Youth, 708 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1983); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 72 
F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (challenging conditions on First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds); McRedmond v. Wilson, 402 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (challenging conditions of confinement for "Persons in 
Need of Supervision" on 8th and 14th Amendment grounds), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 533 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1976); Swansey v. 
Elrod, 386 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Ill. 1975) (challenging conditions of confining juveniles awaiting adult criminal prosecution 
based on the Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment ); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974) 
(challenging conditions on cruel and unusual punishment grounds under state and Federal Constitution), rev'd on other grounds, 
535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977); Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (challenging 
detention of juveniles prior to finding of criminal guilt on Fourteenth Amendment grounds because juveniles were deprived of 
rehabilitative care and treatment); Inmates of Boys' Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972) (challenging 
confinement of juveniles in adult correctional facilities on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 
F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (challenging conditions of confinement of non-criminal juveniles based on 8th and 14th 
Amendment grounds); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972) (challenging conditions including corporal 
punishment, use of tranquilizers, solitary confinement, and mail censorship), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.); Lollis v. Department 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In Pena v. Division of Youth, 78 one of the earliest 
cases to recognize a constitutional right to treatment, the court wrote:  
Because Goshen is an institution which is a part of the juvenile justice system of 
the State of New York, it is the conclusion of this court that the boys placed there have a 
constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment. 
            In the past few years, the United States Supreme Court has reviewed four cases 
arising out of the juvenile justice system to determine whether the Constitution requires 
that specific procedural due process rights be accorded juveniles subject to adjudication 
in that system. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 
(1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); In re Gault, 
387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 
86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). While none of these cases required the Court to 
address itself squarely to the question of the juvenile's right to rehabilitative treatment, 
the conclusion which this court draws from a reading of those cases is that such a right 
does exist. In declining to find that all procedural safeguards available to adult defendants 
are mandated for the juvenile, the Court made it clear that the constitutional justification 
for this procedural deprivation is the parens patriae underpinning of the juvenile justice 
system and its absolute proscription against punishment and retribution as permissible 
objectives. The premise relied upon by the Court in each case was that the objectives of 
the juvenile justice system "are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the 
child . . . not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment." Kent v. United States, 
supra at 554, 86 S.Ct. at 1054… 
Thus, considering the underlying assumptions of the above cited Supreme Court 
cases and the outright assertions of those lower court cases cited, and considering, too, 
the recent Supreme Court decision regarding the right to treatment of persons civilly 
committed to mental health institutions, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 
2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (1975), this court finds that the detention of a 
youth under a juvenile justice system absent provision for the rehabilitative treatment of 
such youth is a violation of due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.79                                      
                 
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court in the 1980’s, Youngberg v. Romeo80 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
of Social Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (challenging conditions of confinement based on Eighth Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process grounds).   See also, generally, Holland and Mlyniec, supra note 38  
78 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) 
79 Id. at 206-207 
80 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (Holding that a mentally retarded person involuntarily commited to state care has a 
constitutionally protected liberty interests under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to reasonably 
safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such minimally adequate training 
as reasonably might be required by these interests, but a state has good faith immunity from liability where 
professional judgment was exercised and lack of training was dictated by state budget concerns.) 
need parenthetical summarizing holding) 
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services,81 significantly limited the 
constitutional obligations that can be imposed on the State when individuals, including youth, are 
taken into their custody.  In the wake of these decisions, more recent jurisprudence has grounded 
the juvenile’s right to individualized treatment directly in the purpose clause of the particular 
State’s juvenile act, still drawing on the Supreme Court’s admonition thirty years ago in Jackson 
v. Indiana82 that, “[a]t least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment 
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.”83  State of 
Louisiana in the Interest of S.D.84 is a recent example of this legal approach:  
With respect to juveniles adjudicated delinquent under state laws, federal courts 
have repeatedly held that where 'the purpose of incarcerating juveniles in a state training 
school is treatment and rehabilitation, due process requires that the conditions and the 
program must be reasonably related to that purpose.' …(citations omitted)….85 
 
 The court in S.D. then determined that, because “the [statutory] goal was to take a young 
life and try to get it back on track--while there was still time and hope--so that he might come to 
live as a full member of society," lack of "individual rehabilitative treatment" was 
unconstitutional.86   As Holland and Mlyniec have concluded, even in the face of legislative 
 
81 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (Finding that a state has no constitutional duty to protect a child from parental abuse even 
after receiving reports that abuse is occurring because the state is not constitutionally charged with the duty of 
protecting citizens from “private violence) 
82 406 U.S. 715 (1972) 
83 Id. at 738. 
84 State ex rel S.D. 2002 WL 31514414 at **1, 25 (La.App.4 Cir. Nov. 6, 2002). 
85 Id. at **25.   
86 Id. at **29.  See also, Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding juvenile detainees 
protected by Fourteenth Amendment right to treatment); Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 (10th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that confined juveniles retain liberty interests protected by Fourteenth Amendment, including reasonably 
safe conditions, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and adequate training), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 
(1983); Alexander v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 797-98 (D.S.C. 1995); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that juveniles have right to be provided with adequate food, shelter, medical care and 
minimally adequate training); Hendrickson v. Griggs, 672 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (finding that Iowa 
legislature intended to confer special benefits upon distinct class of detained juveniles); Doe v. Strauss, No. 84-
C2315, 1986 WL 4108 at * 4 (N.D. Ill. March 28, 1986) (holding that juveniles have right to therapy reasonably 
designed to effect rehabilitation and proper development); Stamps-Bey v. Thomas, 618 F. Supp. 1122, 1125 
trends toward a more punitive juvenile justice system, “state laws [have] preserve[d] their 
original rehabilitative goals and [these goals] form the heart of delinquent children’s right to 
receive such care and services.  Simply put, states are obligated to serve as the substitute parents 
they promise to be.  They are responsible, along with parents, for ensuring that children in their 
care master the identifiable skills needed to develop into responsible and productive adult 
citizens.”87 
Equal Rights Analysis on Behalf of Women and Girl Offenders: Comparing Apples and 
Oranges? 
 
Having established that girls in the juvenile justice system often have distinct needs from 
boys, and that the juvenile court is statutorily required to meet the individual needs of all of the 
youth who appear before it, we turn to a discussion of equal rights strategies to enforce this 
mandate.  The three strategies we discuss, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, state Equal Rights Amendments and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, all hold promise – and a note of caution.  Litigation by adult women prisoners challenging 
gender-based disparate conditions, policies and practices under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX has  
                                                                                                                                                             
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding legitimate right to treatment under Due Process Clause), aff'd, 788 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1986); 
State v. S.H., 877 P.2d 205, 216 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that juvenile offenders have right to adequate 
treatment under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). But see, Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 992 
(D.P.R. 1982) (finding no constitutional obligation to provide rehabilitative treatment to juveniles), aff'd in part, 
vacated in part, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983); State of Washington v. S.H., 877 P.2d 205 (Wash. App. 1994) 
(finding a constitutional and statutory right to treatment). 
87 Holland and Mlyniec, supra, note 38 at 1794.  (Stating that another theory that has supported a right to treatment 
is the “quid pro quo” theory, which holds that rehabilitation is due because the juvenile does not get the full due 
process and procedural protections of an adult criminal defendant.  This theory expresses "a recognition of the 
concurrency between the state's exercise of sanctioning powers and its assumption of the duties of social 
responsibility.  Effective treatment must be the quid pro quo for society's right to exercise its parens patriae 
controls); Martarella, 349 F. Supp. at 600.  See also, In re C.B., 708 So.2d 391 (La. 1998) (using similar analysis 
more recently).   
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met with mixed success.88  Jurisprudence under state Equal Rights Amendments is quite 
limited with respect to prison conditions and practices.  While it is beyond the scope of this 
article to provide a comprehensive review and critique of the case law involving women 
prisoners, these cases nevertheless lurk in the background of any discussion of an equal rights 
strategy on behalf of girls.   
One cannot help but ask, why should equal rights challenges on behalf of girls fare any 
better?  First, because whether or not adult women and men prisoners are similarly situated, the 
juvenile court’s focus on the individual offender’s needs minimizes the risk that individual 
differences will trump equality of treatment in challenges brought by girls.  Second, the higher 
standard of review afforded sex-based classifications by most of the state equal rights provisions 
should elevate judicial review of sex-based claims in the juvenile system above the rational 
relationship test currently applied to most constitutional challenges in the adult prison context.  
Third, because the adoption of the rational relationship test for adult offenders was motivated by 
 
88 Because equal rights analysis in adult corrections arises, in part, due to the predominance of sex-segregated 
prisons and programming in adult corrections, see e.g., Merry Morash, Timothy S. Bynum, and Barbara A. Koons. 
1998. Women Offenders: Programming Needs and Promising Approaches. National Institute of Justice Research in 
Brief. Washington, DC; U.S. Department of Justice (Elements deemed conducive to success in these programs 
included many that were gender specific: staff who provided strong female role models, the opportunity to form 
supportive peer networks, and attention to women's particular experiences as victims of abuse, as parents of 
children, and in negative relationships with men.); American Correctional Ass., 1995 Directory: Juvenile & Adult 
Correctional Departments., Institutions., Agencies & Paroling Authorities., (1995) (indicating that Alabama, Kansas, 
Maine, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia operate no female facilities, and that besides 
Alabama, these states house their women in gender-integrated institutions), this ongoing debate is particularly 
relevant for our discussion of equal rights analysis for girls in the justice system. See See, Stephanie Fleischer 
Seldin, A Strategy for Advocacy on Behalf of Women Offenders, 5 Colum. J.  Gender & L. 1 (1995).  To date, there 
has been no study clearly supporting either approach as more beneficial to the development and rehabilitation of 
girls in the systems although the more current thinking favors single gender programming.    
One reason offered for single gender programming is to provide girls with a safe place to address histories 
of victimization which are so prevalent among confined girls.  Another persuasive reason for single gender 
programming is that historically coeducational programming has resulted in programming directed at boys, who 
comprise the majority, with no attention to the specific needs of girls.  
Whether in the context of a co-educational or single gender program, the design and programming for girls 
should be gender-responsive – addressing the specific developmental issues presented by girls in the justice system 
and sensitive to the way in which society’s expectations for girls impacts their development.   
penological concerns that favor deference to prison administrators, the juvenile court’s emphasis 
on rehabilitation makes these concerns less compelling in the face of similar claims by girls.  
Finally, Title IX’s protection of equality in educational programming and activities is 
particularly applicable to alleged discrimination in juvenile justice programming and services, 
where juvenile residential programs must serve a dual role as residential schools for their school-
age residents who retain their state-created rights to basic and special education even while in 
placement. 
Each of these theories for distinguishing juvenile from adult offenders, and the juvenile 
from the adult criminal justice system, is discussed below.  
Federal Equal Protection Analysis 
 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “commands that no State 
shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is 
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”89  When 
addressing equal protection claims, courts apply one of three standards of review: strict scrutiny, 
intermediate or heightened scrutiny, or rational relationship test.90  Generally, a governmental 
policy “is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute [or 
policy] is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”91  Where suspect or quasi-suspect 
classifications or fundamental rights are at issue, the court will apply “strict” scrutiny to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
89 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).   
90 See, e.g., id. at 433; See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 
611 (1960) (inferring that rational basis test requires state action be rationally related to legitimate state interest); 
Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 424 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that rational basis test requires rational relationship 
between regulation used and legitimate state interest). There is also a third type of test, an intermediate test that falls 
somewhere in between the strict scrutiny and rational basis tests. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) 
(describing that intermediate scrutiny test requires state regulation be substantially related to an important 
governmental interest); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 712 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) 
(stating that equal protection analysis involves three-stage test).  
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classification, requiring that it be more narrowly tailored to meet a substantial or compelling 
governmental interest.92 
 Up until 1971, gender-based classifications were subject to the rational relationship test.93  
In 1971, the Court decided Reed v Reed,94 ruling for the first time in favor of a woman who 
charged that her State had denied her equal protection of the law in its statutory scheme 
regarding the administration of decedents’ estates.  Since Reed, “the Court has repeatedly 
recognized that neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection 
principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full 
citizenship stature – equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society 
based on their individual talents and capacities.” 95 
 While the Court has declined to equate sex with race or national origin as a suspect 
classification, thus elevating the level of review to strict scrutiny, the Court has, since Reed, 
“carefully inspected official action that closes a door or denied opportunity to women (or to 
men.)”96  The current standard was most recently articulated by the Court in United States v. 
Virginia,97 where the Court held the Virginia Military Institute could not constitutionally deny 
women enrollment.  Courts confronted with claims of differential treatment or denial of 
opportunity based on sex “must determine whether the proffered justification is ‘exceedingly 
 
91 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 
92 Id.; see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 & n.14 (1982). 
93 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). (Upholding Michigan law prohibiting women from working behind a 
bar unless it was owned by their father or spouse by finding that the state had a rational interest in protecting 
women). 
94 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) 
95 U.S. v Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996). 
96 Id 
97 Id. 
persuasive.’”98  The State, which bears the full burden, must show “at least that the [challenged] 
classification serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means 
employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’” 99 Significantly, 
“[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to 
litigation.  And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities or preferences of males and females.”100  
Despite this backdrop of substantial constitutional skepticism regarding official gender-
based policies and practices, equal protection challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
disparate treatment and conditions asserted by adult women offenders have faced significant 
obstacles.  First, courts have not tended to view men and women prisoners as similarly situated.  
Thus, while adult men and women are theoretically incarcerated for similar purposes – 
punishment, public safety, deterrence, retribution and, lastly, rehabilitation -- the fact that women 
are most often incarcerated in different facilities for shorter time periods, with lower security 
ratings, for less serious or violent crimes, as well as the fact that they alone can get pregnant or 
are more likely to be parents, has led courts to conclude that men and women prisoners are not 
similarly situated for the purposes of equal protection analysis.101  While some dissenting judges 
have noted the circular reasoning of this analysis – the more disparate the treatment of men and 
women prisoners the less such disparities may be subjected to constitutional scrutiny102 -- the 
majority view remains that the inquiry fails at this threshold level.  
                                                 
98 Id at 533. 
99 Id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). 
100 Virginia, 518 U. S. at 533. 
101 See, e.g., Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia v. Dist. of Columbia, 93 F. 3d 910, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
Pargo v. Elliot, 894 F.Supp. 1239 (S.D. Iowa 1994), vacated, Pargo v. Elliot 49 F.3d 1355 (8th Cir. 1995); Klinger v. 
Dep’t of Corr. 31 F. 3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994). 
102 Women Prisoners, 93 F. 3d at 951 (Rogers, J.dissenting) 
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In Klinger v. Department of Corrections,103 for example, the Eighth Circuit dismissed an 
equal protection challenge by women prisoners who claimed that the programs at the all-
women’s prison were vastly inferior to those available at the men’s prison on the basis that the 
men and women prisoners were not similarly situated.  The court focused on dissimilarities in 
prison size and inmate characteristics: the male prison was larger and housed more violent 
criminals with longer sentences; women inmates were more likely to be primary caregivers and 
to be victims of physical or sexual abuse.104  Finding further that “[d]ifferences between the 
challenged programs at the two prisons are virtually irrelevant because so many variables effect 
the mix of programming that an institution has,”105 the court concluded, “comparing programs at 
[the men’s prison] to those at [the women ‘s prison] is like the proverbial comparison of apples 
to oranges.”106 
Following Klinger, in Pargo v. Elliott,107 where a similar equal protection claim by 
women prisoners in Iowa was rejected for the same reasons, the district court stressed five areas 
of difference that defeated the women prisoners’ claim: population size of the prisons in 
question, security level, types of crimes, length of sentence and special characteristics.108  Most 
recently, and plainly adopting the reasoning of Klinger and Pargo, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals in Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia v. District of Columbia109 
likewise ruled the women prisoners were not similarly situated to their male counterparts in their 
challenge to unequal programming for women and men in the District.  In reversing the district 
 
103 See Klinger, 31 F. 3d at 729 
104 Id. at 732. 
105 Id. at 733. 
106 Id.  
107 Pargo, 894 F. Supp. at 1259-61 
108 Id. 
109 See Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d. 910 
court on this issue, the D.C. Court of Appeals specifically faulted the district court for failing to 
take into account “the striking disparities between the sizes of the prison populations that were 
being compared,”110 and for failing to make any findings, for comparison purposes, of the types 
of crimes committed by the male prisoners or other special characteristics of the male 
prisoners.111  This ruling prompted a stinging dissent, which aptly observed, 
The court relies on the different characteristics of the facilities to conclude that 
the otherwise identical men and women incarcerated therein are not similarly 
situated, and on that basis holds that there can be no judicial comparison of the 
differences in the treatment accorded to them.  The anomalous result is that the 
more unequal the men’s and women’s prisons are, the less likely it is that this 
court will consider differences in the prison experiences of men and women 
unconstitutional.  Indeed, by maintaining drastically unequal prisons for the two 
sexes, the government could foreclose any comparison of the rehabilitative 
programs it provides for the benefit of men and women.  This analysis stands the 
concept of equal protection on its head.112 
          
The second stumbling block women prisoners have encountered is that despite  
contemporary equal protection jurisprudence requiring intermediate scrutiny of sex-based 
classifications, where courts have considered the equal protection challenge they have tended to 
apply a rational relationship, rather than heightened scrutiny test, to these challenges.  In 
applying a lesser level of scrutiny to claims of gender-based discrimination by women prisoners, 
these courts have relied principally on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Turner v. Safley113 
and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,114 that prison regulations challenged as burdening or interfering 
with the exercise of constitutional rights are subject to only minimum constitutional scrutiny.  As 
                                                 
110 Id. at 925. 
111 Id.; See also, Keevan v. Smith, 100 F. 3d 644 (8th Cir. 1996) (Finding male and female inmates were not 
similarly situated and thus dismissed claim. Female inmates housed at two Missouri penal institutions challenged 
Department of Correction’s policy for determining the placement of prison industry employment under the Equal 
Protection Clause;); See generally, Angie Baker, Leapfrogging Over Equal Protection Analysis: The Eighth Circuit 
Sanctions Separate and Unequal For Males and Females in Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F. 3d 727 (8th 
Cir. 1994), 76 NEB. L. REV. 371 (1997).  
112 D.C. Women’s Prisoners, 93 F. 3d at 951 (emphasis in original) 
113 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) 
114 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) 
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the Court wrote in Turner, “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional 
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.  In our 
view, such a standard is necessary if ‘prison administrators..., and not the courts, [are] to make 
the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.’”115  In applying Turner, courts have 
drawn a distinction between equal protection challenges that allege discrimination between 
prison programs themselves, and challenges to the process by which programming decisions are 
made.  Pargo and Klinger held that challenges aimed at the programs themselves do not 
implicate a facial challenge to gender-based statutes, polices or procedures, and accordingly are 
both subject to only rational relationship scrutiny and require proof of invidious 
discrimination.116  On the other hand, prison policies may be subject to a heightened scrutiny 
review in an equal protection analysis of the decision making process. "[M]ale and female 
inmates are similarly situated for purposes of the process by which the Department makes 
programming decisions. That is, instead of alleging differences in programs between prisons, a 
proper equal protection claim may allege differences in the process by which program decisions 
were made at the prisons."117 As a consequence, when courts have viewed the women’s 
prisoners’ challenges as targeting gender-neutral programming differences, the courts have 
upheld the challenged practices or policies as reasonable under the Turner test.118 
                                                 
115 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see also, Washington v. Harper 494 U.S. 210, 221-226 (1990); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 
490 U.S. 401, 402, 404, 407 (1989). 
116 Pargo, 894 F. Supp at 1241;  Klinger, 31 F. 3d at 732. 
117 Pargo, 849 F. 3d at 1241, 1242; Klinger, 31 F. 3d at 733. 
118 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; Pargo, 849 F. 3d at1241, 1242; Women Prisoners. 93 F. 3d at 932; but see, Pitts v. 
Thornburgh, 866 F. 2d 1450, 1453, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (women prisoners challenging the policy of the District of 
Columbia to incarcerate women prisoners in distant and remote correctional facilities, while maintaining facilities in 
the District itself for male offenders.  The Court declined the District’s invitation to apply Turner’s rational 
relationship test to the challenged policy: “Turner applies to cases involving regulations that govern the day-to-day 
operations of prisons and that restrict the exercise of prisoner’s individual rights within prisons.  This case, in stark 
contrast, challenges general budgetary and policy choices made over decades in the give and take of city politics.  
 Nevertheless, while Klinger and Women Prisoners cloud the prospects for equal 
protection challenges to discriminatory prison practices based on gender, the landscape is not 
entirely bleak.  There are decisions in other circuits that have found in favor of the women 
prisoners. 
 Glover v. Johnson119 is one of the earliest – and longest running – prison cases alleging 
disparities between men’s and women’s prisons.  Spanning twenty years of litigation and court 
rulings, the case is also an example of the evolution of equal protection and constitutional 
analysis generally in prison litigation.  Begun in the 1970’s, Glover involved, among other 
claims, an equal protection challenge to four key areas of programming for men and women: 
educational opportunities; vocational training; apprenticeship opportunities; and work-pass 
opportunities.  Noting at the time the novelty of the women prisoner’s claims,120 the district court 
found the men and women prisoners similarly situated under the Equal Protection Clause, 
applied heightened scrutiny to the women prisoner’s claims, and held the appropriate standard 
against which the disparate programs should be measured was “parity of treatment.”  As the 
court then explained, 
The term “parity of treatment” describes concisely the standard to which…the 
State ought to be held in its treatment of female prisoners.  In other words, Defendants 
here are bound to provide women inmates with treatment and facilities that are 
substantially equivalent to those provided the men – i.e., equivalent in substance if not in 
form – unless their actions, though failing to do so, nonetheless bear a fair and substantial 
relationship to achievement of the state’s correctional objectives.121  
      
                                                                                                                                                             
Equally important, the basic policy decision whether to provide a local women’s prison facility does not directly 
implicate either prison security or control of inmate behavior, nor does it go to the prison environment and regime.  
In sharp distinction to our case, the Court in Turner stressed the discretion to be afforded prison officials in making 
the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.”)  
119 Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (D. Mich. 1979), remanded to, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (E.D. Mich. 1999).  
120 Glover, 35 F. Supp 2d at 1012 (1999) (district noting, it uncovered only one other unpublished decision involving 
gender disparities in prisons at the time Glover was originally filed). 
121 Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1079. 
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Although the district court’s original decision was unappealed, this standard of “parity” 
was upheld by the Sixth Circuit in subsequent proceedings, noting that the district court had 
“correctly identified the remedial goal to be achieved in this litigation – parity in the treatment of 
male and female prisoners.”122  Significantly, the district court has made clear this does not mean 
identical treatment.  In finding parity among programs even where the offerings are not 
uniformly available to male and female prisoners, the district court stated, “It is important to 
observe at this point that the Equal Protection Clause does not require identical treatment; thus 
the mere fact that some of the fringe vocational programs are provided only to male inmates does 
not disturb well-established equal protection principles.”123      
  While the Glover court declined in its most recent decision to revisit its original finding 
that the men and women were similarly situated, or that the case involved a facial classification 
in the availability and distribution of educational and work opportunities to the female 
inmates,124 the court did feel bound to adopt the lesser rational relationship standard of review set 
forth in Turner.  Because the court was being asked to evaluate the present parity of conditions, 
the court concluded that “an equal protection case involving gender-based classifications in a 
prison setting cannot be evaluated today without using the reasonable relation standard of 
Turner.”125  Applying this standard of review to the current array of opportunities for the male 
and female inmates, the court found they met the parity standard.   
                                                 
122 Glover 138 F. 3d at 241 (emphasis in original); See also, Bukhari v. Hutto,487 F. Supp 1162, 1172 (same). 
123 . Id.; Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1021(1979), (finding parity in vocational programming, the court relied on the fact 
that while 17 total vocational programs were offered to men and only 7 to women, the six vocational programs most 
frequently offered to men were also offered to women inmates). 
124 Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1015 
125 Id. (district court expressly rejecting the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F. 2d. at 1453-
1454). 
 
In West v. Virginia Department of Corrections,126 the District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia was presented with a claim by female offenders which demonstrated how 
lack of access to the same types of programming available to males can result in longer and more 
severe sentences for young women.127  In West, the plaintiff claimed that though the Virginia 
statute authorizing boot camps as a sentencing option was facially neutral,128 the Department of 
Corrections violated equal protection by establishing a boot camp program exclusively for 
men.129  The evidence of sentencing disparity as a result of the unavailability of boot camps for 
women under twenty-four was striking:  women denied access to the boot camp alternative could 
suffer an increased sentence of as much as 18 years.130 
Though decided after Turner and O’Lone, the court found the sentencing distinction 
“clearly drawn between male inmates and female inmates,” and applied intermediate scrutiny,131 
requiring a finding that the gender classification was “substantially related to an important 
governmental objective.”132  Virginia sought to justify the male-only program as a pilot program 
established to address overcrowding and recidivism that was more pronounced among male 
                                                 
126 West v. Virginia Dep’t. of Corr., 847 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Va. 1994) 
127 See In re Gwenette D., 237 Cal Rptr. 41 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1987) (a juvenile girls challenged her placement in a 
locked juvenile facility on equal protection grounds arguing that California’s failure to maintain an intermediate 
unlocked facility for girls as it does for boys violated her right to equal protection.  Though the court noted that such 
a clam was facially possible, it denied Gwenette’s challenge on the grounds that the court’s sentencing decision was 
supported in the record)   
128 There are also examples of equal protection or ERA challenges to juvenile justice related statutes, which 
discriminate by gender on their face.  See e.g., People v. Ellis, 57 N.E. 2d 98, 100 (Ill. 1974) (Invalidating a juvenile 
code provision under the Illinois ERA, which allowed seventeen year old females to be tried in juvenile court while 
seventeen year old males were tried as adults); Similar statutes existed in Oklahoma and Texas, OKLA. STAT. tit. 
10, § 1001 (1998) amended by OKLA. STAT. tit. 1. § 7001-1.3(2000); Tex. Civ. Code Ann. Art. 2338 – 1, § 3 
(repealed 1973).  See also, New York Family Court Act, N.Y. Family Law § 712(b) (McKinney 1998) (amended 
2001) (New York amended its PINS status which defined jurisdiction for the status offenses for girls until eighteen 
and for boys until sixteen). 
129 Virginia Dep’t of Corr., 847 F. Supp. at 404. 
130 Id. at 404, n. 4. 
131 Id. at 406.  See also Bukhari V. Hutto, 487 F. Supp. at 1171 
132 Virginia Dep’t of Corr., 847 F. Supp. at 406. 
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prisoners but that could subsequently be extended to young women,133 and as an appropriate 
allocation of limited financial resources.134  Rejecting the state’s justification as constitutionally 
inadequate under the Equal Protection Clause, the court stated “defendants … cannot provide 
programs and favorable sentencing to male inmates solely on the basis that the problems are 
more pressing in male prisons and it is more cost effective to address those problems…(citations 
omitted)…If defendant’s argument were carried to its logical extension, then the same argument 
could be used to deny women inmates the opportunity for education, vocational training, or 
rehabilitation.  Surely such an inequitable distribution of resources is not contemplated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”135  Squarely presenting the issue of gender parity, the court found no 
compelling interest in presenting male and female offenders with such unequal sentencing 
options.  Even conceding the significant deference accorded prison administrators, the court held 
“when an extremely favorable sentencing alternative is presented to one class of inmates and not 
another, and when that classification is based solely on the inmates’ gender, that line is 
crossed.”136     
 
133 West v. Virginia Dep’t. of Corr., 847 F. Supp. at 406, 407 (The court’s reservation about the extension of the 
program model as designed for men to the population of women applies as well to modeling girls’ programs after 
boys’ programs in the juvenile justice system, without actually evaluating the appropriateness of the model for 
girls); see also, Oregon’s Treatment Foster Care at 
http://www.strengtheningfamilies.org/html/model_programs_1997/mfp_pg4.html (describing one successful model, 
which has been closely tracking the features of the girls in the program, the way in which the program is 
implemented for girls, and the outcome measure)  
134 See Bukhari, 487 F. Supp. at 1171(court sympathizes with the Department of Corrections dilemma that the cost 
of providing programs in a small women’s prison is high but says that the fiscal issues cannot justify operating a 
prison system in an unconstitutional manner) (Commonly jurisdictions argue that the cost of providing specialized 
programming to a small number of girls is prohibitive.  This complaint is behind the practice of sending girls out-of-
state to specialized programs.  Sex offender programming for girls is one example but many jurisdictions extend the 
practice to medium or high security programming; programs like the Brown School in Texas at 
http://www.nationjob.com/brownschools/, for example, are populated with girls from Illinois or Pennsylvania unable 
to visit with their families and increasing the probable difficulty they will have re-entering their communities. 
135 Id. at 407. 
136 Id. at 408. 
Another recent example of more favorable treatment of women inmates’ claims is 
Clarkson v. Coughlin.137  In Clarkson, the federal district court for the Southern District of New 
York found an equal protection violation where deaf female inmates were denied the same 
access to a special unit accessible to deaf and hearing-impaired male inmates.  As a consequence, 
the female inmates were generally not provided the same assistive devices and interpretive 
services in educational, counseling and medical settings that the male prisoners were.  The 
plaintiffs, who included a class of deaf and hearing-impaired male prisoners as well, asserted 
claims under not only the Equal Protection Clause, but also under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,138 the Rehabilitation Act,139 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment140 and the Eighth Amendment.141   
The only justification put forth by the New York State Department of Corrections for this  
gender disparity was that there were more deaf and hearing impaired male inmates requiring 
such services than females.142  Without specifically stating its standard of review, but implicitly 
finding the male and female deaf and hearing-impaired inmates were similarly situated, the court 
flatly rejected this as a basis for such flagrant differential treatment of female inmates.143  The 
court also rejected claims of administrative convenience or savings of time, money and effort as 
acceptable justifications for the disparity.144  The court held that the defendant was required to 
provide the female inmates with access to the same range of special services provided to the 
men.145 
                                                 
137 Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
138 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102, et. seq. 
139 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. 
140 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
141 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
142 Id. at 1051. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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Implications for litigation on behalf of girls 
For lawyers looking to bring federal equal protection challenges to unequal conditions on 
behalf of girls in the juvenile justice system, what lessons can be drawn from the women 
prisoners’ cases?  Several questions are presented for consideration: Are the plaintiffs similarly 
situated to their male counterparts? What is the appropriate standard of review? What constitutes 
a facial, as compared to gender-neutral, classification? What governmental interests may be held 
to support the maintenance of disparate policies or practices? 
With respect to the threshold question whether the litigants are similarly situated, the 
juvenile justice system’s promise of individualized treatment and rehabilitation places girls on a 
stronger footing than adult women prisoners who are necessarily limited by the traditional 
criminal law objectives that drive the adult corrections system.   As discussed at length above, 146  
the juvenile justice system was built upon the philosophy that the individual needs and 
characteristics of adjudicated youth must be identified and met.  Accordingly, their so-called 
dissimilarities as offenders or ‘inmates’ is precisely what makes them ‘similar,’ for the purpose 
of equal protection analysis.  In other words, both male and female juvenile offenders are 
similarly situated in their shared right to an individualized disposition once adjudicated 
delinquent.  
The standard of review of gender-based claims in the adult correctional context is clearly 
unsettled.  Some of the more recent cases favor the rational relationship test applied in Turner 
and O’Lone.  Even these cases however, have drawn a distinction between challenges to the 
process by which program decisions are made and challenges to differences in the programs 
                                                 
146 see discussion supra, at       . 
themselves.147  Thus, there remains the opportunity to frame challenges to disparities in the 
juvenile justice system to fit within the “process” exception noted by the Eighth Circuit in 
Klinger, which agreed that male and female inmates are similarly situated at the beginning of the 
decisionmaking process.148  Claims that a court or agency has taken boys’, but not girls’ needs 
into account, for example, in designing or offering a particular program or service, may warrant 
the higher level of scrutiny under this rationale.  Additionally, in those states where gender is 
accorded specific constitutional protection, discussed at length in the next section,149 the higher 
standard of review afforded gender-based classifications under many of these state Equal Rights 
Amendments should elevate review of claims of disparate treatment above the minimal rational 
relationship of Turner and O’Lone.  Moreover, because the purpose of the juvenile justice system 
remains avowedly non-punitive, we suggest that the penological concerns that drive the 
deference to prison administrators in the adult prison context are inapplicable in the juvenile 
justice system where rehabilitation, not punishment, is the driving force.  Lastly, again in view of 
the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile system, even under a rational relationship test, there is 
arguably no legitimate government interest that justifies affording girls a diminished opportunity 
for individualized treatment and rehabilitation.     
Whether these discriminatory consequences flow from facially neutral, or facially 
discriminatory laws or practices, is an important consideration because, at least under the federal 
Equal Protection Clause, intentional discrimination must be proven by the plaintiffs if the 
disparity arises from a facially neutral law or practice.150  Where statutes themselves draw 
                                                 
147 See e.g., Klinger, 31 F. 3d at 733. 
148 Id. 
149 See infra at    . 
150 See, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (Holding that veterans preference 
in hiring for state civil service positions did not violate equal protection despite the strong statistical advantage that 
it provided to male applicants)..  Under state Equal Rights Amendments, there is a developing body of caselaw that 
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gender–based distinctions, such as laws or regulations that expressly assign or allocate different 
vocational, educational or work opportunities to male and female inmates, the discrimination 
plainly flows from facially discriminatory laws and proof of intentional discrimination should be 
unnecessary.  Similarly, even where laws or regulations are neutral on their face, but where 
administrative or other official action enforces the policy or practice in an overtly discriminatory 
way, such as the boot camp program challenged in West, or the initial implementation of the drug 
court described at the beginning of this article, the resulting discrimination should also be viewed 
as emanating from a facially discriminatory policy.  Likewise, to the extent that girls are 
officially assigned to sex-segregated programs by executive or legislative policy, and those sex-
segregated programs provide lesser rehabilitative opportunities or inadequate individualized 
treatment options for girls, any such discriminatory consequences should also be considered the 
result of facial discrimination.   
Finally, regarding what constitutes a legitimate governmental interest, the answer will 
turn in part on the standard of scrutiny accorded the challenged classification or practice.  Under 
intermediate or strict scrutiny, economic justifications based on conserving resources or 
allocating limited resources will not be acceptable.151  In West, even the argument that a program 
was being tested as a pilot with just the male class of inmates was rejected.  Again, given the 
juvenile court’s emphasis on rehabilitation, however, and the argument that boys and girls are 
similarly situated with respect to his purpose, it is hard to conceive of any governmental 
 
has rejected the need to prove intentional discrimination where the challenged practice is facially neutral.  See 
discussion infra at     . 
151 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570-573 (1996) (Providing that economic justifications for 
excluding females are inadequate to overcome constitutional scrutiny.); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 
535 U.S. 425, 450-460 (2002) (Holding that economic justifications do not meet intermediate government scrutiny 
of zoning provisions.) 
objective, legitimate, substantial or compelling, that would justify disadvantaging girls with 
respect to this purpose.    
State Equal Rights Amendments 
Most state Equal Rights Amendments have been modeled after the proposed federal 
Equal Rights Amendment, and typically provide that “[E]quality of rights under the law shall not 
be denied or abridged….because of the sex of the individual.”152 
Nineteen states currently have equal rights amendments,153 which were enacted in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.154  Though they are not used frequently, they present a potentially 
powerful litigation tool for girls.  State ERAs often require a higher standard of review than the 
intermediate level of scrutiny favored under the federal Equal Protection Clause.  As many as ten 
of the nineteen states subject gender based classifications to strict scrutiny;155 some adopt an 
even higher “absolutist” standard, permitting no-sex-based classifications except those required 
                                                 
152 PA. CONST. Art. 1, § 28; See also, Alaska Const. art. I, § 3, (No person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil 
or political right because of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin); Colo. Const., art II, § 29; Conn. Const. art. I, 
§ 20; Fla. Const. art. I, § 2, (all natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have inalienable 
rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for 
industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property…No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, 
religion, national origin, or physical disability); Haw. Const. art. I, §3; §5; Ill. Cont. art. I, § 18; Iowa Const. art. I, § 
1, (All men and women are equal by nature, free and equal, and certain inalienable rights—among which are those 
of enjoying life, liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness); La. 
Const. art. I, §3, (No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws…no law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, 
or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political 
ideas or affiliations); Md. Const., Declaration of Rights, art. 46 (1981); Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. 1. (added in 1976); 
Mont. Const. art II, § 4; N.H. Const. pt. 1, art 2; N.M. Const. art II, § 18; Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a; Utah Const. art IV, 
§ 1, (The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of 
sec.  Both male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and 
privileges); Va. Const. art I, §11, (The right to be free from any governmental discrimination upon the basis of 
religious conviction, race, color, sex, or national origin shall not be abridged, except that the mere separation of the 
sexes shall not be considered discrimination); Wash. Const. art. XXXI, §1; Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 1 
153 See generally, Paul Benjamin Linton, Same-Sex “Marriage” Under State Equal Rights Amendments, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L. REV. 909 (2002) (discussing  how each state might address same-sex “marriage” under its state ERA 
154 Florida and Iowa are exceptions, amending their constitutions in 1998 to include gender. FLA. CONST. art.I,§2; 
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 1.   
155 See CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; HAW. CONST. art. I, §3, §5; ILL. CONST. art. I, §18; MD. CONST. DEC. OF 
RIGHTS art. 46; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2; N.M. Const. art. II, § 18;  TEX. CONST. 
art. I, §3a; WASH. CONST. art. 6, § 1. 
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by actual physical differences between men and women.156             
However, as with federal equal protection analysis there are hurdles to overcome.  First, 
under state ERAs there must be a determination that the males and females in question are 
similarly situated,157 and second, in applying state ERAs to prison regulations, at least two courts 
have adopted the reasoning from Turner158 and O’Lone159 that inmates’ constitutional rights are 
limited in the prison environment.  
  For example, two courts applying the state ERA to an adult corrections case limited the 
ERA’s application.   In Wise v. Department of Corrections160 and Morris v. Collins,161 courts in 
Pennsylvania and Texas upheld state prison regulations regarding hair length in the face of 
challenges under those states’ ERAs.  In both cases the courts upheld state correctional policies 
without going through traditional ERA analysis.  Relying instead on O’Lone,162 both courts 
applied the rational basis test and upheld the prison grooming policies as reasonably related to 
valid penological objectives.    
On the other hand, there have been two cases in which Massachusetts’ courts used the 
state Equal Protection Clause and the ERA to address challenged prison policies without 
reducing the level of scrutiny.  In M.C. v. Commissioner of Correction,163 the Supreme Judicial 
Court applied equal protection and ERA analysis to a statutory scheme which gave “good time 
 
156 Caselaw from md and wash citing to absolute standard?  
157 See discussion supra at…., arguing that juvenile justice system’s goal of individualized treatment and 
rehabilitation makes boys and girls similarly situated for that purpose in an equal rights analysis. 
158 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
159 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabbaz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
160 Wise v. Dep’t. of Corr., 690 A. 2d 846 (Comm. Ct. PA 1997) 
161 Morris v. Collins 916 S.W. 2d 527 (Tex. App. 1995) 
162 O’Lone, 482 U.S. 342 at 349. 
163 M.C. v. Comm’n. of Corr., 507 N.E.2d. 253, 254, 255, 256 (Mass. 1987) (female inmate, who was denied a 
request to transfer to an all male forestry camp, seeking declaratory judgment that statutes according good time 
credit” for time in prison camps which were only available to males.  Ultimately the case was 
dismissed as moot because the woman prisoner was released.  In Todd v, Commissioner of 
Corrections,164 the Court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment for the defendant on equal 
protection and ERA grounds.  The Court of Appeals struck prison disciplinary regulations which, 
while neutral on their face, were only being applied against male prisoners.  The court found that 
the Department of Corrections did not provide sufficient justification for the unequal application 
of the policy.165  
Illinois, Montana, and Florida have considered state ERA challenges to juvenile justice 
statutes and judicial decisions.  In Illinois, the state ERA was used successfully to challenge a 
statute which set the age of adult criminal jurisdiction at seventeen for males and eighteen for 
females.166  The court struck down the statute as violating the state ERA and noted that under the 
state ERA gender was a suspect classification and the state justification must survive strict 
scrutiny.167   
In Florida and Montana, two states which have not settled on a standard of review under 
their state ERAs, courts considered challenges to sentencing brought by young women based on 
arguments that the harsher sentences they received resulted from lack of sufficient programming 
for girls in the juvenile justice system.  Though these cases involved claims that mirror the types 
of claims suggested by this article, both cases were decided on different grounds and are 
therefore of limited value in assessing the prospects for other similar claims.  For example, in 
                                                                                                                                                             
credit to forestry prison camp inmates violated ERA because only male prisoners occupied forestry camps.  Court 
vacated and remanded as moot and did not address ERA issue). 
164 Todd v. Comm’n. of Corr., 763 N.E.2d. 1112, 1114 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (examining the constitutionality of a 
prison disciplinary regulation that on its face applied to all prisoners but was only enforced as to male prisoners). 
165 Id. at 1119 
166 People v. Ellis, 311 N.E2d 98 (Ill. 1974) 
167 Id. at 101, 102.   
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State v. Spina,168 a girl who was transferred to adult criminal court challenged her transfer under 
the state ERA, arguing that it was driven by the lack of secure placements in the Montana 
juvenile justice system for girls.169  The Montana Supreme Court, however, rejected her assertion 
that the lack of secure placements for girls in Montana was the primary reason for her transfer 
and upheld the transfer on other statutory grounds.  In Spina, the court used general equal 
protection analysis and an intermediate standard, making it difficult to determine the role the 
state ERA played in the court’s decision.  
In Benson v. Florida,170 the female defendant challenged her juvenile sentence on, among 
other grounds, the Florida equal protection clause, claiming that it was the result of the lack of 
“Level 10” programs for girls in Florida (there are Level 10 programs for boys in Florida.)     
While the court noted that her argument appeared to have merit “on its face,” it found that the 
sentencing decision was based on factors other than the lack of Level 10 programs for girls, and 
that the court would not have sentenced her to one of these programs even if one existed.171  
Both Spina and Benson illustrate a drawback to individualized sentencing, which allows courts to 
cast aside broad-based challenges to sentencing practices or policies by finding the particular 
sentence warranted by the individual youth’s circumstances. 
Another critical difference between federal equal protection analysis and analysis under 
state ERAs is the standard of review.  While claims of unconstitutional gender discrimination are 
 
168 State v. Spina, 982 P.2d 421 (Mont. 199). 
169 See id., (distinguished from People v. Ellis 311 N.E2d  at 99, 100, which challenged the jurisdiction statute as 
facially discriminatory, while in Spina 982 P.2d at 437 the defendant’s challenge focused on the application of the 
transfer law).  
170 Benson v. Florida, 763 So. 2d 1235, 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2nd District  2000) 
171 Id. at 1237 (In Florida the basic rights provision of the Constitution was amended in 1998 to include a prohibition 
of discrimination by gender). 
 
accorded, at best, an intermediate standard of review under federal equal protection law,172 at 
least ten of the nineteen ERA states require higher justification for gender-based classifications 
under the state ERA.  Washington has applied absolute scrutiny to sex-based classifications, 
allowing no justification for gender-based classifications short of an actual physical difference 
between the sexes.173  Maryland has also applied an absolute standard, holding in Rand v. 
Rand,174 for example, that “the law will not impose different benefits or different burdens upon 
the members of society based on the fact that they may be man or woman.” More recently, in 
Tyler v. State,175 the Maryland Supreme Court held that “sex, like race, is a suspect classification 
subject to strict scrutiny.”176  There is some question, therefore, as to whether Maryland has 
reduced the standard of review from absolute to strict scrutiny, but in either case Maryland 
applies a higher standard than the federal standard.. 
Eight other states clearly apply a strict scrutiny standard to sex based classifications 
under their states’ ERAs.  These are Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, and Texas.177  As with the absolutist states, the courts in these states 
                                                 
172 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (citing Univ. of Miss v. Hogan, See supra text accompanying note 120). 
173 See, Turner, 474 A. 2d at 1301 (stating Female Sitters law allowed males and not females to be employed as 
sitters and therefore violated the state ERA); Rand v. Rand, 374 A. 2d 900, 905 (Md. 1977); (affirming that 
following adoption of Equal Rights Amendment, parental obligation for child support is not primarily an obligation 
of father but is one to be shared by both parents and the sex of the parent in matters of child support cannot be a 
factor in allocating the responsibility to support the child); Darin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (Wash. 1975) (court 
held that the broad language of the ERA meant that citizens intended to do more than repeat the protection available 
under See Darin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975) (court held that the broad language of the ERA meant that 
citizens intended to do more than repeat the protection available under federal equal protection). 
174 374 A. 2d 900 (Md. 1977) 
175 Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 1297, 1301 (Md. 1984) (finding unconstitutional under Maryland’s ERA the state’s 
exercise of premonitory challenges based on gender, citing, State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 269, 
(Md. 1989))   
176 Id.  
177 See Low-Income Women of Texas v. Bost, 38 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tex. App. 2000) (stating “The ERA elevates 
sex—along with race, color, creed, and national origin—to a suspect classification, and any law that classifies 
persons for different treatment on the basis of sex is subject to strict judicial scrutiny”); New Mexico Right to 
Choose/ NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841, 853 (N.M. 1998) (“(T)he Equal Rights Amendment requires a searching 
judicial inquiry concerning state laws that employ gender-based classifications. This inquiry must begin from the 
premise that such classifications are presumptively unconstitutional, and it is the State’s burden to rebut this 
presumption.”); Cheshire Medical Center v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344, 1346, 1347 (N.H. 1995) (finding that 
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have viewed their state’s adoption of an ERA as an indication of legislative intent to afford a 
higher level of protection to gender-based discrimination than that afforded by federal equal 
protection analysis.178  Under the strict scrutiny standard, sex-based classifications in statutes, 
regulations, policies, or practices are presumed invalid unless they serve a compelling state 
interest, are narrowly drawn to protect that interest, and the interest cannot be adequately 
protected by an alternative means.179  
In just five of the nineteen states, Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, Virginia, and 
Wyoming.180 the standard applied is either rational basis – less than the federal standard – or the 
 
common law doctrine of necessaries must be read to include both genders in order to pass strict scrutiny); Baer v. 
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 47 (Hawaii, 1993) (holding that same sex marriage ban was subject to strict scrutiny pursuant to 
the state equal rights amendment); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 156 (Conn. Supp. 1986) (applying a strict scrutiny 
standard of review in invalidating  provision forbidding Medicaid funding for medically necessary abortions); 
Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Athletic Ass’n. Inc., 378 Mass. 342, 354 (1979) (providing that any standard less 
than strict scrutiny would make the amendment meaningless). 
178 See e.g., N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841, 851 (N.M. 1998) (stating, we address the 
Department's claim that Rule 766 does not warrant heightened judicial scrutiny because it is based on a physical 
characteristic unique to one sex, namely the ability to become pregnant and bear children. We conclude that this 
unique physical characteristic does not exempt Rule 766 from a searching judicial inquiry under New Mexico's 
Equal Rights Amendment); People v. Ellis, 311 N.E. 2d 98, 101 (Ill. 1974) (stating, we find inescapable the 
conclusion that [the ERA] was intended to supplement and expand the guaranties of the equal protection provision 
of the Bill of Rights and requires us to hold that a classification based on sex is a 'suspect classification' which, to be 
held valid, must withstand 'strict judicial scrutiny); See also, Martin B. Marguiles, A Lawyer’s View of the 
Connecticut Constitution, 15 CONN. L. REV. 107 (1982) (noting that “Dissimilar language in state provisions that 
have federal counterparts, supplies an even more compelling reason for expanding protection of individual rights.  
One of the most fundamental cannons of constitutional interpretation is that no language is presumed to be without 
effect.  Although mere legal fiction, the principle requires courts to assume that each word was included only after 
careful consideration by the drafters.  Different language therefore must be interpreted to have different 
consequences). 
179 See e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P. 2d 44, 47 (Haw. 1993) (holding that statute restricting marriage to members of 
the opposite sex is a sex based classification subject to scrict scrutiny under state constitution); Holdman v. Olim, 
581 P.2d 1164 (Haw. 1978) (holding regulation that women visitors to an all-male prison wear brassiere withstands 
strict scrutiny under the ERA as necessary to protect a compelling state interest); See also, O’Lone 482 U.S. at 350. 
180 See Dept. of Health and Human Serv. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 28 P.3d 903 (Ak. 2001) (Applying 
intermediate review to equal rights challenge of abortion funding law); In re Detention of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 
547 (Iowa 2000) (Applying intermediate scrutiny to challenge of sexually violent predator act); State v. Miller, 663 
So.2d 107, 109 (La. App. 1995) (Upholding statutory rape law that can only be used against young men under 
intermediate scrutiny standard); Austin v. Livak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984) (Requiring only a rational relationship to 
a reasonable objective in challenge to statute of repose in medical malpractice action); Archer v. Mayes, 194 S.E.2d 
707,711 (Va. 1973) (Rejecting challenge to law allowing women to opt out of jury duty to care from children, 
applying an intermediate level of scrutiny). 
 
standard is unsettled.  Within this group, Alaska and Virginia apply a rational basis test, 
upholding the sex-based classification if the court finds that the purpose of the statute or practice 
is legitimate and it is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.181  
Finally, Florida, Montana, and Utah have not yet determined standards of review for cases under 
their ERAs.182    
Implications for litigation on behalf of girls  
Though at least two courts have limited protection under state ERAs when the claim 
arose in a prison context, adopting the federal equal protection analysis, a similar limitation in 
the juvenile justice context is unlikely.  As stressed  above,183 juvenile justice is sufficiently 
different from adult corrections in purpose and design, to merit the full protection of state ERAs.  
Moreover, the few state cases which have applied ERAs to challenged policies in the juvenile 
justice arena have shown no inclination to limit its application.   
Assuming the application of state ERAs to girls’ claims of lack of equal access or lack of 
gender responsive programming, courts will consider whether the parties are similarly situated, 
and whether the challenge involves an “explicitly established sex-based distinction”184 on the 
face of the statute, rule, regulation or policy.  With respect to whether the girls will be found to 
be similarly situated to boys in the juvenile system, the same arguments we suggest under the 
federal equal protection clause apply with equal force here.  Adjudicated boys and girls are 
plainly similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the court’s intervention – individualized 
rehabilitation and treatment. 
Regarding whether the challenged practice is facially discriminatory or gender-neutral on 
                                                 
181 See, Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 28 P.3d at 905-908; Archer, S.E.2d at 711.  
182 See, Paul Benjamin Linton, Same-Sex “Marriage” Under State Equal Rights Amendments, 46 St. Louis U. L. J. 
909, 915, 931-934, 951-954 (2002) 
183 See supra at      . 
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its face, the court applying the state ERA will examine a gender neutral practice to determine 
whether it is discriminatory in its application and impact.  Unlike the federal Equal Protection 
Clause, state ERAs may not require a discriminatory motive or purpose, rather, they may protect 
against a discriminatory impact when a practice or policy, “visibly operates to a particular 
disadvantage of women.”185   
The availability of state ERA protection without proof of discriminatory intent when the 
policy or regulation appears neutral but has a disparate impact is particularly critical for our 
analysis.  Both the problem of unequal access by girls to juvenile programming, and the lack of 
gender-responsive programming could be the result of gender-neutral policies which 
disadvantage girls in their operation and enforcement. For example, residential programs such as 
that described in jurisdiction “Y” at the beginning of this article which provide girls nothing 
more than participation in a juvenile justice program designed for boys, have a discriminatory 
impact on girls by failing to provide them individualized programming, yet there are likely no 
policies or procedures declaring that girls be denied such programming.  Similarly, the drug 
 
184 Buchanan v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 471 N.E.2d 345, 348 (Mass. 1984) 
185 See, e.g.,  Nat’l Org. for Women v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Ins. Dept., A.2d 744 (Pa. 1989) 
(considering whether insurance commissioner’s approval of equal rates for men and women for automobile 
coverage created “de facto” discrimination against women.); Commonwealth v. An Unnamed Defendant, 492 
N.E.2d 1184 (Mass. 1986) (Court found disparate impact in the selective enforcement of prostitution statute which 
was gender neutral on its face); Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53 (Md. 1985) (The court affirmed the 
lower court’s finding that “While noting that § 19(e)(4) does not facially discriminate against either sex, or impose 
greater burdens, or provide greater benefits to a particular sex, the court held that the statute violated the E.R.A. 
because, notwithstanding its facial neutrality, it had a discriminatory effect”); Buchanan v. Director of Div. for 
Employment Security, 471 N.E.2d 34 (Mass 1984) (Found that although the base-earnings requirement for 
unemployment compensation is not violative on its face, it may violate the state ERA when applied to pregnant 
public school teachers taking an unpaid maternity leave); Snider v. Thornburgh, 436 A.2d 593 at 599 (Pa. 1981) 
(Found that facially neutral… policies which have the practical effect of perpetuating …discriminatory practices 
constitute discrimination by sex); Braintree v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 383 N.E.2d 1251, 
1255 (Mass. 1979) (Found ERA violation in gender neutral policy denying accumulated sick leave to pregnancy 
related disability occurring at the beginning of maternity leaves). 
 
 
court manual in jurisdiction “X” was written with gender neutral language, referring to eligibility 
of “clients,” “youth,” and “candidates,” yet it was understood that the program was available to 
boys only and no girls were referred.  While an official decision to exclude girls solely on the 
basis of their sex should be treated as a facially discriminatory policy, the adoption of eligibility 
criteria that relied on a history of drug arrests accompanied by violence, for example, which 
might apply to many more boys than girls, would be an example of a gender-neutral criteria with 
disparate impact.   
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
Another potential tool for achieving equality in the programs and services offered to girls 
in the juvenile justice system is through Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.186  Title 
IX provides, in relevant part, that “no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”187  The harms that this 
article addresses -- laws, policies and practices that disadvantage girls in the juvenile justice 
system -- clearly fit within the intended objectives of Title IX as articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court: “to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory                                                     
practices,” and “to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices.”188   
More importantly, because Title IX is aimed at gender equality in education, its use in 
addressing discrimination in juvenile programs is particularly promising.  Virtually all youth in 
the juvenile justice system are school-age,189 and many remain subject to state compulsory 
                                                 
186 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (Title IX”), see also, 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1- 106.71 (implementing regulations). 
187 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (a).  Juvenile justice systems and facilities may receive federal dollars through a variety of 
federal funding streams, including IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et. seq., see, e.g., 20 U.S.C.  § 1412 (outlining the 
requirements for state eligibility for federal funding); the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 
7100 et. seq.; and Medicaid, to provide for the care of medically needy children. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396. 
188 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). 
189  
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school attendance laws.190  Accordingly, whatever state-created rights to basic and special 
education – the latter of which is also protected under federal law191 – youth in a given state 
possess, incarcerated youth possess the same rights.192  To the extent programming in juvenile 
justice facilities is provided in accordance with state educational requirements, discrimination on 
the basis of gender would be flatly prohibited by Title IX.  In this respect, juvenile correctional 
facilities are more analogous to residential schools than they are to adult prisons.  Additionally, 
the right to treatment recognized by many courts relies not only on the juvenile court’s focus on 
rehabilitation, but also encompasses a right to education for adjudicated youth.193         
As with the discussion of the federal Equal Protection Clause and State ERAs, the 
starting point of our discussion is to review how such claims have fared on behalf of adult 
women offenders. 
 
190 See, e.g., MGL tit 12 Ch 76 S 1 (1983) (stating Every child between the minimum and maximum ages established 
for school attendance by the board of education... shall, subject to section fifteen, attend a public day school in said 
town, or some other day school approved by the school committee, during the number of days required by the board 
of education in each school year...); PA St. Tit.24 Ch. 1 Art XIII S 13-1327 (1992) (stating every child of 
compulsory school age having a legal residence in this Commonwealth, as provided in this article, and every 
migratory child of compulsory school age, is required to attend a day school in which the subjects and activities 
prescribed by the standards of the State Board of Education are taught in the English language); IL St. Ch. 105 S 
5/26-1 (stating Whoever has custody or control of any child between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall cause such 
child to atten! d some public school in the district wherein the child resides the entire time it is in session during the 
regular school term). 
191 IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et. seq., see, e.g., 20 U.S.C.  § 1412 (outlining the requirements for state eligibility for 
federal funding). Because these dollars follow the individual special needs dollars, it is unclear is a systemic Title IX 
challenge may be successfully be brought by a youth without special education needs. A small amount of money 
provided to the state pursuant to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 7100 et. seq., may be 
channeled to the facilities through the state.  Some state facilities may also receive Medicaid dollars to provide for 
the care of medically needy children. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396. 
192 See, e.g., CT ST § 10-253 (Connecticut law providing that school privileges apply to children in placement); NY 
EDUC  § 4002 (Providing that “Each child between the ages of five and twenty-one who resides in a child care 
institution and who has not yet graduated from high school shall be entitled to receive a free and appropriate 
education in the least restrictive environment for that child); 10 Okl.St.Ann. § 7306-2.11 (Oklahoma Statute 
providing that children committed to the department of youth have a right to public education); AR ST § 9-28-205 
(Providing that Arkansas youth study centers must meet the educational standards set by the department of 
education and that youth in placement have a right to education).   
193 See discussion supra at         . 
By definition, Title IX applies to all correctional facilities that receive federal 
assistance.194  Women prisoners challenging discriminatory practices or conditions have 
therefore also looked to Title IX for relief.    However, similar to challenges brought under the 
federal equal protection clause – and despite this clear statutory applicability -- Title IX 
challenges to discriminatory programming in adult prisons have found little success, and yielded 
contradictory analyses.   
Jeldness v. Pearce was the first federal court of appeals examination of the applicability 
of Title IX to a challenge by women prisoners to unequal prison programming.195  In Jeldness,  
the Ninth Circuit held that the language of Title IX, which does not explicitly exempt prisons 
from its reach as it does other organizations and activities, applies to all prisons receiving federal 
funding.196  The court extended this analysis to the applicability of the implementing regulations, 
holding that, “it is clear that the regulations are not meant to apply only to traditional educational 
                                                 
194 45 C.F.R. § 106.2 (clarifying the definitions of the terms in the act, providing, in relevant part that:  
Program or activity and program means all of the operations of-- 
(1)(i) A department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or local government; or 
(ii) The entity of a State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency 
(and each other State or local government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a 
State or local government; 
(2)(i) A college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education; or 
(ii) A local educational agency (as defined in 20 U.S.C. 8801), system of vocational education, or other school 
system; 
(3)(i) An entire corporation, partnership, other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship-- 
(A) If assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; 
or 
(B) Which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care, housing, social services, or 
parks and recreation; or 
(ii) The entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to which Federal financial assistance is 
extended, in the case of any other corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship; or 
(4) Any other entity that is established by two or more of the entities described in paragraph (h)(1), (2), or (3) of this 
section; any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance).  
195 Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994). (citing prior to Jeldness, two federal district courts had allowed 
Title IX suits against state prisons to go forward.)  See also,  Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 
1982) vacated on other grounds, 869 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1989); Beehler v. Jeffes, 664 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Pa. 1986). 
The analysis of the Canterino opinion is examined and in large part adopted by the court in Jeldness. See Jeldness, 
30 F.3d at 1224-1228. 
196 Jeldness at 1225. 
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institutions.”197  In applying both the Act and the regulations, the court held that the Oregon 
prison system failed to meet Title IX’s equality demands by its complete failure to provide 
“equal opportunity” for women prisoners to participate in educational and vocational programs 
of “comparable quality.”198  The decision provided promise that Title IX would be an effective 
tool for challenging the vast programming inequities between men’s and women’s prisons.  
Title IX’s applicability to alleged discriminatory prison programming was revisited by 
the Eighth Circuit in Klinger v. Department of Corrections.199   In Klinger, the court recognized 
that Title IX was applicable to prison programming, potentially providing relief even when 
plaintiffs are unable to successfully advance a constitutional equal protection claim.200  The court 
further held that the plain language of the statute absolved plaintiffs from the requirement of 
demonstrating that they were “similarly situated to” male prisoners, reasoning that: 
(i)n our opinion, Congress has indicated, by its enactment of § 1681(a) and by the 
specific language employed therein, that female and male participants within a given 
federally- funded education program or activity are presumed similarly situated for 
purposes of being entitled to equal educational opportunities within that program or 
activity.201  
 
However, the court ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, reasoning that Title IX analysis 
required a look at the entire “system of institutions operated by the state’s federally-funded 
agency.”202  The court based this holding on the definition of “program or activity” provided in 
the statute, reasoning that because the definition covered “all of the operations of a government 
 
197 Id at 1226. 
198 Id at 1229. 
199 Klinger, 107 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 1997). 
200 Id at 614- 616.  
201 Id. at 614. 
202 Id at 616. 
agency,” a look at all of the programs of that agency was required to determine whether the 
agency was Title IX compliant.203  
  In  D.C. Women Prisoners, the D.C. Circuit rejected the approach of the Klinger court, 
holding  that the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that they were “similarly situated” to 
male prisoners in order to advance a successful claim under title IX.204  In determining whether 
they were “similarly situated” for the purposes of challenging the programming as 
discriminatory, the Court looked to a variety of factors, from security levels of prisoners to 
underlying offenses.205  The court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that they were similarly 
situated to the male prisoners, and therefore dismissed the Title IX claim without addressing it on 
the merits. However, in dicta the court expressed skepticism toward future Title IX claims in the 
adult prison context, stating: “. . . even though we do not address the scope of Title IX in the 
prison context, we admit to grave problems with the proposition that work details, prison 
industries, recreation, and religious services and counseling have anything in common with the 
equality of educational opportunities with which Title IX is concerned.”206  
Implications for litigation on behalf of girls 
 These three decisions reflect the reported case law to date on the applicability of Title IX 
to the correctional context.  Like the federal equal protection and state ERA cases, they suggest 
potential hurdles for girls looking to bring similar claims in the juvenile justice system, and 
                                                 
203 Id. at 615 (This reading is arguably not commanded by the language of the statute. The phrase “all of the 
operations of a department, agency…” could also be read to institute a no tolerance approach toward discrimination. 
That is, the entire entity must be void of gender discrimination or the agency can be held liable for the 
discrimination of any of its parts. The legislative history evoked by the court in order to support their contention is 
also in support of this alternate reading, as is the articulated overarching purpose of Title IX as articulated by the 
Supreme Court (providing bill summary language referring to liability of “the entire entity” to argue that an 
examination must occur system-wide); See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704. 
204 D.C. Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 927 (1996). 
205 See id. at 925. In deciding if the plaintiffs were “similarly situated” the court looked both at Klinger and at Pargo 
v. Elliot in determining the factors to apply in their analysis.  Pargo articulated five factors for consideration: 1) 
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specifically leave some questions unresolved.  Must plaintiffs demonstrate that they are 
“similarly situated” to male prisoners under equal protection standards in order to seek relief 
from discriminatory practices? What programs and activities fall within the commands of Title 
IX? And finally, when mounting a Title IX challenge, must plaintiffs allege that the 
discrimination occurs throughout the entire system, or may a claim be successfully pursued by 
comparing the programming at two individual facilities, or even one facility housing both men 
and women, or boys and girls?     
Despite the contradictory and narrow decisions in the adult system, Title IX should be an 
effective tool for improving access to programs and services for girls in the juvenile justice 
system.  Given the distinctions between adult and juvenile corrections highlighted in this article, 
the obstacles encountered by women prisoners should not discourage Title IX litigation on behalf 
of adjudicated girls. The strong wording and intent of the Act, coupled with its aggressive 
enforcement in the high school and college athletic context – where gender-segregated 
programming is common but inequality is not tolerated -- should provide a powerful litigation 
tool to challenge the injustices that girls experience. 
Additionally, the fact that most juveniles are school-age and must be provided the 
opportunity to earn high school credits, a high school degree or a GED even while incarcerated 
makes Title IX particularly relevant to charges of gender-based discrimination in juvenile 
facilities’ programming.  While courts may be hesitant to characterize discrimination in adult 
vocational, recreational or counseling programs, for example, as discrimination in educational 
 
prison population, 2) level of security 3) types of crimes committed 4) length of sentence and 5) special 
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opportunities for Title IX purposes,207 these same services are an integral part of the educational 
program typically offered school-age youth, delinquent or otherwise.  Discrimination in their 
availability to juvenile offenders should fall squarely within the parameters of Title IX.    
A. Establishing that Male and Female Juvenile Offenders are “Similarly Situated” 
The first central dispute in Title IX prison jurisprudence is whether women prisoners must 
demonstrate that they are similarly situated to male prisoners in order to demand equality in 
programming and services. While the analysis in Klinger that absolves women from such a 
showing arguably has more commanding logical force on its face, even the concerns highlighted 
by D.C. Women Prisoners are alleviated by the factual and legal realities of the juvenile system. 
In imposing this requirement in D.C. Women Prisoners, the court looked to factors 
including underlying offense levels and the length of sentence. These factors are not applicable 
in the juvenile context where the underlying offense does not generally dictate the disposition 
received and the length of sentence is typically indeterminate, targeted toward effective 
treatment rather than a fixed period of incarceration/incapacitation.  As argued above, juvenile 
offenders in placement are all similarly situated with respect to the central goal of this system:  
they were removed from home environments in order to best effectuate their successful treatment 
and eventual return to society.  No juvenile in placement is, by the command of the law or 
justifications of the system, any less “deserving” of adequate programming or services that will 
allow them to achieve this goal. The only fact separating the girls in the juvenile justice system 
from their male counterparts is their gender- a fact triggering scrutiny under Title IX. 
B. Establishing What Programs and Services are Covered by Title IX 
The differences between the legal justifications of the juvenile and adult systems are also 
relevant to the question of the programmatic scope of Title IX.  As noted above, most juveniles 
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held in detention and/or placement facilities have a continued right to public education, a right 
that is consistent with the statutory goals of rehabilitation and treatment.208  This education must 
meet standards imposed by local and state educational authorities and must also be in compliance 
with the mandates of all applicable federal education laws.  Accordingly, assessing the 
programmatic reach of Title IX to juvenile offenders is best accomplished by examining the 
reach it has on state and local educational agencies. This reach is dictated by the implementing 
regulations of Title IX as imposed by the Department of Health and Human Services, along with 
any interpretation of those regulations as provided by the courts.209   
The enacting regulations of Title IX make explicit that the wide array of courses that may 
be offered by an educational institution receiving federal funding are all subject to the equality 
requirements of the Act.  34 C.F.R. § 106.34, entitled “Access to Course Offerings” provides, in 
relevant part: 
A recipient shall not provide any course or otherwise carry out any of its education 
program or activity separately on the basis of sex, or require or refuse participation 
therein by any of its students on such basis, including health, physical education, 
industrial, business, vocational, technical, home economics, music, and adult education 
courses.  
 
While the corrections facilities may impose a necessary separation of genders, this 
separation can not be used to deny females access to equal opportunities to courses in any of the 
areas delineated in the regulation.210  Significantly, the types of course offerings listed above are 
 
208 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15A.210; Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Tommy P. v. Board of 
Comm'r, 645 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1982); State v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145 (Wash. Dec 22, 1982); Inmates of Boys Training 
Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972). 
209. See Chevron v. Natural Resource Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); See also, Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1225 (holding that 
the implementing regulations of Title IX are applicable to the adult prison context); Klinger 107 F.3d at 615; D.C. 
Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 931(both failing to reach the merits of the Title IX claims, precluding any discussion 
of the application of the regulations).  
210 See Jeldness 30 F.3d at 1225; Tommy P. v. Board of Comm'r, 645 P.2d at 702 
precisely the types of educational programs and activities that are – or should be – made 
available to male and female youth in the juvenile justice system.   
The implementing regulations of Title IX further require that a local educational agency 
may not exclude any person from admission to a vocational education program on the basis of 
sex unless the agency “otherwise makes available to such person, pursuant to the same policies 
and criteria of admission, courses, services, and facilities comparable to each course, service, and 
facility offered in or through such schools.”211  Accordingly, even if the vocational program 
offered in the facility is not an official course offering of the local or state school authority 
administering the general education requirements, the program still falls within the reach of the 
regulations and must be offered in a manner consistent with gender equality. 
This is particularly important for girls in the juvenile justice system, where it is not 
uncommon for jurisdictions to offer different or more limited vocational opportunities to girls 
than boys.212  And while the court’s interpretation of “parity of programming” in Glover v. 
Johnson, under the Equal Protection Clause, allowed acknowledged discrepancies in vocational 
offerings for men and women prisoners to remain in place, Title IX’s express requirement that 
equal access be provided to both genders, or access to “comparable programs” be provided, 
suggests a stricter standard of comparison than what may be tolerated under equal protection 
analysis. 
Recipients of federal financial assistance that fall within the reach of Title IX and make 
employment available to any of its students must “assure itself that such employment is made 
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available without discrimination on the basis of sex.”213  While employment per se may be less 
of an issue for youth, there are employment training and youth workforce programs that may be 
available to adjudicated youth.214  Accordingly, these types of programs as well should be made 
equally available to both genders. 
The applicability of Title IX to athletic programming provided by recipients of federal 
aid, particularly in educational contexts, has generated the most Title IX litigation.  The 
regulations require equal opportunity to participate in and benefit from any interscholastic, 
intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletics offered by any federal aid recipient.215  This 
requirement is applicable to detention facilities where boys are provided superior athletic 
facilities, more recreational opportunities, and/ more coaching or tutoring.216 
 Indeed, judicial enforcement of the requirements of the athletic provisions of Title IX 
provides insight into how courts should address the application of Title IX to juvenile facilities. 
Like some facilities in the juvenile justice system, athletic teams are often gender separated, and 
Title IX allows such separation, provided that equality of opportunity remains.217  In Cohen v. 
Brown University, the First Circuit explained that Title IX imposes a requirement that institutions 
receiving federal funding must effectively meet its students’ interest and abilities in athletics 
under 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1).218  The Ninth Circuit elaborated on this requirement, noting that 
Title IX is also a tool for remedying past discrimination resulting from stereotyped notions of 
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women’s interests and abilities.219  Accordingly, recipients supported by federal funding must 
take a proactive approach in ensuring that the foundational assumptions of their programming, as 
well as any effects of that programming, promote gender equality.220  Programming decisions 
that rely upon “archaic” gender assumptions amount to intentional discrimination in violation of 
Title IX.221  
 C.  The Scope of the Institutional Programs Subject to Comparison 
 The third area of dispute that surfaced in the adult prison cases is the institutional scope 
of the challenge that must be brought to come within the purview of Title IX.222  Does the Act 
require courts to compare every program run by a state correctional agency in order to determine 
if the Act is being violated? 
 The strict language of the Act and regulations implies the opposite: that if any program 
run by a larger entity violates the Act the entire agency is subject to Title IX liability.223 This 
reading best promotes the purpose of Title IX -- to promote equality and increase opportunities 
for all women and girls.  In a corrections context this is even more pronounced because, “(a) 
prisoner has no liberty interest in being housed in a particular facility.”224  Accordingly, the only 
way to insure the equality of educational opportunity mandated by Title IX to any individual girl 
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is to allow courts to look at individual boys’ and girls’ facilities side-by-side to determine if 
equal opportunity is available, or whether discrimination exists within a single facility where 
girls and boys reside together.  
The scope of the programs to be examined in litigation will most likely be determined by 
considering what individual entity is the recipient of federal funds, be it a local or state agency. 
System-wide inquiries do not dilute the efficacy of Title IX in promoting equality of 
programming.  Rather, litigation challenging entire juvenile systems of care may highlight the 
gross disparity of programming and opportunities between boys and girls in juvenile facilities.  
Conclusion 
 Girls in the juvenile justice system are like unexpected guests who arrive too late to find a 
seat at the table.  The door is wide open to them, but there is little to sustain them once they 
enter.  The qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in gender appropriate services for 
adjudicated girls that we have described in this article require prompt and thoughtful attention 
from public officials, policymakers, administrators and providers, judges, and lawyers.  In this 
article, we have offered a suggested blueprint for legal challenges that may be brought to remedy 
some of the disparities and disadvantages that girls face.  But as lawyers, we occupy only a few 
seats at this table.  We urge all of the individuals who share the responsibility of meeting the 
needs of these young women to also look behind them, and make room.         
                                                                                                                                                             
224 Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1983) 
